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Abstract
In order to reduce economic and national security risks, U.S. energy policy, in
2005 and 2007, mandated production of renewable biofuels. By 2014, the renew-
able biofuel industry was consuming approximately one-third of domestic corn
and soybean production. To meet this growing demand, conservation and pas-
tureland has been cultivated with corn and soybean, resulting in a reduction in
ecosystem services, such as carbon storage, wildlife habitat and water quality.
Perennial bioenergy crops (e.g., switchgrass) offer a more sustainable alternative.
However, unlike annual crops, farmers and landowners have little experience with
perennial bioenergy crop production. Uncertainty in production and prices will
impact the supply of these novel crops into an emerging market. Using a stated
preference method, I show that agricultural landowners are willing to produce
perennial bioenergy crops, given competitive returns, but only on a portion of
their land. These results suggest that risk and uncertainty are important con-
siderations in perennial bioenergy crop supply. Next, using a state-contingent
approach to choice under uncertainty, I characterize the comparative static effects
of government incentives to promote perennial bioenergy crop production. I show
that uncertainty can dampen the impact of these incentives and in some cases
even decrease perennial bioenergy acreage. Finally, I estimate the magnitude of
the relative risks and the fixed cost hurdle using a discrete/continuous structural
model. I show that agricultural landowners perceive a relatively high level of risk
from perennial bioenergy crop production and are less willing to produce short
rotation woody crops than perennial grasses.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1
21.1 US Ethanol Policy
Following the energy crisis of the 1970s, the objective of United States (U.S.)
energy policy largely focused on increasing energy independence to reduce eco-
nomic and national security risks. The Energy Tax Act (ETA) of 1978 created an
alternative energy subsidy in the form of a federal excise tax exemption on gaso-
line blends containing at least ten percent ethanol1. This exemption, along with
tax benefits and loan guarantees to ethanol producers and blenders and tariffs on
foreign-produced ethanol, spurred growth in ethanol production of nearly thirty
percent per year in the U.S. between 1981 and 1990 (U. S. Energy Information
Administration, 2011).
In order to reduce economic and national security risks, recent energy policy
has included provisions to increase energy independence. These policies promote
using the U.S.’s large natural resource endowments of agricultural land and forests
to produce energy as part of the strategy to increase domestic energy production.
Federal policies (e.g., Energy Policy Act of 20052) and state policies (e.g., renew-
able portfolio standards), have been effective at increasing domestic bioenergy
production. U.S. production of renewable liquid fuels (i.e., ethanol and biodiesel)
increased from 3.4 billion gallons in 2004, before the passage of the Energy Policy
Act, to 14.9 billion gallons in 2011 (U. S. Energy Information Administration,
2011). Today bioenergy is a small fraction of domestic production but, nonethe-
less, it has contributed to an increase in U.S. energy independence. Net oil imports
peaked in 2005 at 210 billion gallons and have continued to decline at an average
rate of 7.4 billion gallons per year, even with the continued economic recovery (U.
S. Energy Information Administration, 2015).
1Forty cents per gallon (1978), 50 cents per gallon (1982) and 60 cents per gallon (1984).
2Later amended with the Energy Independence and security Act of 2007.
3The Energy Policy Act does include provisions for advanced biofuels from
cellulosic (i.e., structural material of plants) biomass but the lack of commercial
production has resulted in a mandate that is much lower than the original policy
goals. Before 2014, commercial scale production was largely absent. Commercial
scale production began in 2014 (i.e., 33 million gallons), with most of the feedstock
coming from annual crop residues. Removal of crop residues will further increase
the environmental impacts of annual crop production (Lal, 2005).
1.2 Land Use Impacts
Renewable liquid fuel has been primarily produced using corn and soybeans, re-
sulting in major changes to the agricultural sector. While the impact of biofuels on
food prices and the carbon emissions is debated, research has shown that land use
has changed as a result of biofuel policies (Barrows, Sexton, and Zilberman, 2014;
U. S. Environmental Protection Agency, 2010; Searchinger et al., 2008; Tyner
et al., 2010). Between 2006 and 2014, annual field crop acreage increased 2.2 mil-
lion per year on average (U. S. Department of Agriculture National Agricultural
Statistics Service, 2014). Over this period, environmentally sensitive cropland,
including highly erodible land that had been enrolled in the Conservation Reserve
Program (CRP), has been cultivated to meet the increasing demand for corn and
soybeans. The land has come primarily from cultivating land in the CRP (U. S.
Department of Agriculture, 2013b), resulting in a decline in CRP enrollment of
1.3 million acres per year on average between 2006 and 2014 (U. S. Department
of Agriculture Farm Service Agency, 2014). This change in land use can have sig-
nificant detrimental environmental implications (Fargione et al., 2008; Rajagopal
et al., 2007), including decreases in water quality. Total nutrient delivery to the
4Gulf of Mexico from the Mississippi River Basin, which contains seventy four per-
cent of U. S. Cropland,3 has risen with this increase in annual crop acreage (U. S.
Geological Survey, 2014).
Perennial energy crops can produce conservation benefits through the presence
of a live crop year round and the reduction in annual cultivation. Perennial crops
conserve soil and water resources through the perennial presence of deep live root
structures that are not found in annual crop systems. Perennial systems result in
a reduction in cultivation associated with annual replanting of conventional crops.
1.3 Biomass from Perennial Crops
Emerging markets for biomass led the U.S. Department of Energy to evaluate
the potential availability of one billion dry tons of biomass (U. S. Department of
Energy, 2005). The most recent update to this analysis, published in August of
2011, estimates that dedicated energy crops will provide the largest and fastest
growing single source of biomass beyond 2022 (U. S. Department of Energy, 2011).
However, dedicated energy crops are the only source not currently supplying any
biomass into the market. Supply will depend upon economic conditions in the
agricultural sector and the willingness of farmers to adopt dedicated energy crops
into their food and feed cropping systems.
Perennial grasses and woody crops are an alternative source of feedstock for
cellulosic biofuel, bioheat, and biopower. These crops are high yielding and can
produce uniform and consistent feedstocks. New production systems and emerging
markets, especially those dependent on continued government intervention, can
3There is 240.3 million acres of cropland in the Mississippi River Basin (U. S. Department
of Agriculture, 2013a) and 324.8 million acres of cropland in the U.S. (U. S. Department of
Agriculture National Agricultural Statistics Service, 2014).
5have significant risks. Risks and uncertainty can reduce a farmer’s willingness to
adopt perennial bioenergy crops.
Annual energy crops share a similar production regime to their grain and
forage counterparts. Some annual energy crops that are currently produced in
agriculture (e.g., sorghum), have long established production histories and well
developed markets. Producing annual crops for cellulosic ethanol will require lim-
ited agronomic modifications. Perennial bioenergy crops on the other hand, have
production regimes that differ from current annual production of conventional
agricultural commodities and lack well-developed markets. The agronomic dif-
ferences create a barrier to adoption. These barriers include the need to invest
in capital (e.g., equipment and education), the risk and uncertainty in returns,
and other non-financial barriers to adoption (e.g., cultural, perceptions and lack
of information).
Prices in emerging perennial markets can be highly volatile relative to annual
crop markets due to several factors including the limited number of buyers and
sellers. Emerging markets face uncertainty in output and input prices that can
further limit participation by potential producers. In addition, perennial energy
crops may have high yield risks in new environments due to the limited develop-
ment of a variety of cultivars. Farmers likely perceive substantial risks in entering
emerging markets, and their aversion to these risks may limit their willingness to
participate unless compensated.
It is worth keeping in mind that agricultural production is subject to return
risk no matter which crop is produced. Diversifying production by growing more
than a single crop is a common way to manage risk. Currently, this is accomplished
by offsetting the timing of rotations and growing different crops in different fields
across the farm.
6The purpose of this research is to quantify the willingness of agricultural
landowners to produce perennial bioenergy crops at varying relative net returns
by using a stated crop choice approach (Chapter 2). Then, using a crop choice un-
der uncertainty conceptual model, we characterize the comparative static effects
of three policy levers (i.e., establishment cost-share, per acre payments, and price
matching) on perennial acreage. We develop a set of sufficiency conditions for each
directional effect of the policy levers (Chapter 3). Next, we estimate the magni-
tude of the relative risks of perennial bioenergy crop production using a structural
model of crop choice under risk (Chapter 4). A summary and concluding remarks
are presented in the final chapter (chapter 5).
Chapter 2
Perennial Bioenergy Supply: A
Stated Choice Approach
7
82.1 Introduction
In order to reduce economic and national security risks, recent United States
(U.S.) energy policy has included provisions to increase energy independence.
Federal policies such as the Energy Policy Act of 20051 and state policies such as
renewable portfolio standards have been effective at increasing domestic bioenergy
production. Renewable liquid fuel has been primarily produced using corn and
soybeans, resulting in major changes to the agricultural sector. While the impact
of biofuels on food prices and the carbon emissions is debated, research has shown
that land use has changed as a result of biofuel policies (Barrows, Sexton, and
Zilberman, 2014; U. S. Environmental Protection Agency, 2010; Searchinger et al.,
2008; Tyner et al., 2010). The land has come primarily from cultivating land in
the CRP (U. S. Department of Agriculture, 2013b), resulting in a decline in CRP
enrollment of 1.3 million acres per year on average between 2006 and 2014 (U. S.
Department of Agriculture Farm Service Agency, 2014). This change in land use
can have significant environmental implications (Fargione et al., 2008; Rajagopal
et al., 2007) including decreases in water quality.
Perennial crops such as perennial grasses (e.g., switchgrass) and woody crops
are an alternative source of feedstock for bioenergy. These crops pose fewer neg-
ative environmental impacts than corn and soybean, including reductions in soil
erosion, greenhouse gas emissions, and nutrient delivery (Lemus and Lal, 2005;
McLaughlin and Walsh, 1998). Land-use changes, in which perennial vegetation is
replaced by annual crops, further degrade water quality and make meeting water
pollution limits even more of a challenge. In regions that are dominated by annual
crops, some reversion to perennial vegetation is necessary to meet water pollution
limits, even with wide adoption of annual crop conservation practices (Minnesota
1Later amended with the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007
9Pollution Control Agency, 2012).
In order for perennial bioenergy crops to contribute to energy independence
and environmental goals, the cellulosic industry must overcome several challenges.
One challenge is the efficient operation of ethanol production plants in order to
lower production costs. Another is a constant supply of low cost cellulosic biomass
from agricultural land (Gold and Seuring, 2011). Unlike crop residue, which comes
from well established production systems and is readily available in large quan-
tities, perennial bioenergy cropping systems are largely unknown to farmers and
landowners. Given this uncertainty, the production of perennial bioenergy crops
is dependent on the willingness of farmers to produce these crops.
This study evaluates the willingness of agricultural landowners to produce two
major types of perennial bioenergy crops. Much of the previous work has specified
generic perennial bioenergy crops2 or a particular type, usually switchgrass. This
study looks at two major types of generic perennial bioenergy crops — grasses
and woody crops. These two major types have been selected because of the ma-
jor differences in the agronomics, harvest frequency, stand life, and machinery
between the two. Grasses can be harvested annually using common harvesting
equipment. SRWC can be harvested every three or four years and require novel
machinery. The optimal stand life of perennial bioenergy crops can be as long as
10-20 years. Not only must farmers be willing to produce these crops, but agri-
cultural landowners must be willing to agree to longer rental contracts if renters
are to produce them. In addition, the lower management requirements of peren-
nial bioenergy crops may encourage non-farming landowners to produce bioenergy
crops themselves.
2In many cases the examples given are switchgrass or miscanthus.
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With the lack of an existing market and revealed preference data for peren-
nial bioenergy crops, this study uses a stated crop choice approach that randomly
varies net income assumptions regarding perennial grasses and SRWC. Previous
perennial bioenergy crop choice approaches used randomly assigned absolute and
relative net incomes (Paulrud and Laitila, 2010; Bergtold, Fewell, and Williams,
2014) to understand the value of other randomly assigned bioenergy crop charac-
teristics. Our approach is consistent with this research. The data was collected
using a mail survey of farmers in nine counties in the Upper Mississippi River
Basin.
2.2 Methods
Given the lack of revealed preference data on perennial bioenergy production, this
study uses a stated preference method to estimate the willingness of agricultural
landowners to supply perennial bioenergy crops at varying levels of net incomes
relative to the landowner’s current net income. If they were willing to grow
perennial grasses, they were then asked how many acres they would be willing
to devote to grass production. The same set of questions was also asked regrading
woody crop production, resulting in four responses (i.e., two yes/no and two
acreage) and two factors (i.e., relative net income of woody crops and grasses)
for each respondent. The relative income amounts ranged from $-100 to $250 per
acre for grasses and $-50 to $300 per acre for woody crops in $50 increments, for
a total of eight treatment levels for each factor. This results in sixty-four different
versions of the survey.
11
2.2.1 Survey
The survey targeted agricultural landowners in nine counties in the lower Min-
nesota River Valley. The counties include Blue Earth, Brown, Carver, Le Sueur,
Martin, Nicollet, Scott, Sibley, and Watonwan. This population was chosen for
two major reasons. First, these counties have a majority of their land in the lower
Minnesota River watershed. Second, they are adjacent to the Koda Energy bio-
heat and biopower plant and a potential biomass plant site in Madelia, MN. Most
of the agricultural land in this region is used to grow corn and soybeans.
Addresses for the agricultural landowners were obtained through each county
tax assessors office. Records for parcels zoned for agriculture, with greater than
20 acres, were included in the final study population. This prevents land zoned
for agriculture but used for other purposes, such as a homestead, from being
included. Duplicate addresses were deleted. The final study population is 13,850
agricultural landowners in the nine counties.
Sample
After determining the study population, the next step was to randomly draw a
sample size that was large enough for the anticipated results to be statistically
significant at the 95% confidence level.3 With a population of 13,850 (Np) and
an unknown proportion (p) choosing a response category, we use the proportion
(50%) with the most conservative estimate of the sample size. The final sample
size needed to be at least 374 agricultural landowners4 (Dillman, Smyth, and
Christian, 2008). Given that survey response rates can vary widely and depend
on the successful design of the survey, 1000 surveys were mailed anticipating at
3This is a margin of error (B) of 5% and a Z-score (C) of 1.96.
4The minimum final sample size is Ns =
(Np)p(1−p)
(Np−1)(B/C)2+p(1−p) .
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least a forty percent response rate to achieve the maximum sample size.
Mail Survey Administration
The survey used the standard five-contact Dillman mail survey method (Dillman,
Smyth, and Christian, 2008). The survey was conducted in late 2010 and early
2011. First, a pre-notice letter was mailed to the respondents, approximately one
week before the mailing of the first questionnaire, to prepare them to receive the
survey. Then, the survey was mailed with a cover letter explaining the purpose
of the survey and a prepaid envelope to return the survey. One week later, a
reminder postcard was sent that reiterated the importance of filling out the survey
and reminded respondents to return it. When the number of returned surveys
slowed to zero to two per day, approximately four weeks after the first survey, a
second replacement survey was sent. This survey was mailed in an envelope with
a different size and color from that of the first survey and only to addresses that
had not yet responded. The final contact involved a reminder postcard about one
week after the last survey was mailed.
2.2.2 Model
Each landowner in our sample received a randomized set of relative net incomes.
The farmland owners were asked to answer four questions related to their will-
ingness to grow perennial bioenergy crops. Two of the questions were follow-up
questions, and answering the questions was conditional on the response to the
previous question. With more than one response variable, multivariate multi-
ple regression (MMR)5 techniques are preferred to estimating four independent
5Multivariate multiple regression is known as multivariate analysis of covariance (MAN-
COVA) when there are two or more continuous response variables.
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regressions. Given that MMR is a special case of seemingly unrelated regression
(SUR) in which all equations share a comment set of independent variables, MMR
has many of the same advantages as SUR. The advantages include increases in
estimation efficiency without loss of consistency, limits in type I errors by con-
solidating hypotheses testing, and the ability to test hypotheses across response
models (Zellner, 1962). MMR is commonly used for analysis when one of the
variables is randomly assigned.
Regression
Based on the design of our stated choice appraoch, we use a sample selection
mixed-process multivariate multiple regression estimated by simulated maximum
likelihood. The acreage responses are only observed for those respondents who are
willing to grow perennial bioenergy crops. Due to this self selection, it would not
be reasonable to assume that the sample of acreage responses that we received is a
random sample of the population. The binary response equations (yG, yT ) are the
selection equations for the acreage response equations (yg, yt). Using the Heck-
man selection model requires that the independent variables (x) in the acreage
equation (x1) be a subset of the selection equation independent variables (x1, x2)
(Wooldridge, 2002). In multivariate analysis, all equations share a common set of
independent variables (x). Reducing the number of variables in the acreage equa-
tions to allow for the use of Heckman selection is a trade-off between additional
information that the omitted variables would have provided and the bias estimates
of the coefficients in the acreage equations (β1g , β
1
t ) if the sample selection was not
corrected. Using a set of additional explanatory variables in the binary response
questions that are highly correlated with the binary response, and not the acreage
response, will limit the loss of information.
14
The grass and woody crop sets of equations with Heckman selection could be
estimated independently from one another. It is likely that our error in predicting
outcomes for woody crops are correlated to our error in predicting outcomes for
grasses. The two binary equation errors (G,T ) and two acreage equation errors
(g,t) seem most likely to be correlated given that they are the same response
type. The binary and acreage equation errors across grasses and woody crops
may also be correlated. The independent equation model is a special case of
the error correlation model and so the independence of equations can be tested.
Based on our survey approach and the response selection, we use a mixed-process
multivariate multiple regression. The four equations that we estimate are
(2.1a)yG = β
1
Gx
1 + β2Gx
2 + G
(2.1b)yg = β
1
gx
1 + g
(2.1c)yT = β
1
Tx
1 + β2Tx
2 + T
(2.1d)yt = β
1
t x
1 + t
where  is the error term. Our model is then,
(2.2)Y = f(y)
= (1{yG > 0}, yg, 1{yT > 0}, yt)′.
We assume that the error term has a joint normal distribution,
(2.3) = (G, g, T , t)
′ ∼ N (0,Σ).
The co-variance matrix is
(2.4)Σ =

1 σGg σGT σGt
σGg σgg σgT σgt
σGT σgT 1 σTt
σGt σgt σTt σtt

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where the variance of the discrete equations is equal to one, σ is the co-variance,
and σgg, σtt are the variances of the acreage equations.
6 The above regression
model is estimated in Stata with the user written command cmp (Roodman, 2011).
2.3 Results and Discussion
2.3.1 Responses
Survey Response
The survey had a relatively high response rate given its length. Five hundred forty
eight surveys were returned of which fifty-two were blank and four hundred and
nineteen had responses to all the questions used in this study. This is comparable
to the 2007 study of corn and soybean farmers’ willingness to adopt environmental
practices in Michigan by Jolejole, Swinton, and Lupi (2009) (56% response rate)
and significantly higher than the Jensen et al. (2007) survey of the willingness of
Tennessee farmers to grow switchgrass (24% response rate).
Non-Response
As discussed in the previous section, the response rate was relatively high com-
pared to similar studies on perennial bioenergy crops and academic surveys of
farmers in general. If the respondents are a random subsample of the population,
then there should not be any concern regarding nonresponse bias. The challenge,
of course, is that we know very little about the nonrespondents. One common
technique to test for nonresponse bias is to follow up with a random sample of the
nonrespondents and find out why they did not respond (Lindner, Murphy, and
6The error correlation ρ is equal to σ12σ1σ2 .
16
Briers, 2001). Studies that follow up with nonrespondent farmers, when asking
about interest in perennial bioenergy crops, find that the nonresponse is largely
unrelated to their interest in perennial bioenergy crops. Paulrud and Laitila (2010)
found that 56% of the nonrespondents “had no time to answer the questionnaire”
and 27% “generally do not like to answer surveys.” If these reasons are uncorre-
lated with perennial bioenergy crop interest then nonresponse bias will be limited.
Some of the nonrespondents (13%) in their study “had no interest in growing en-
ergy crops.” This would likely bias estimates of the percentage of farmers willing
to produce perennial bioenergy crops upwards. The nonresponse rate for their
study was 50% thus the estimates of the percentage of farmers would be biased
upwards 6.5%.
To examine the nonresponse bias, we first compared the characteristics of the
respondents to the population to determine if our sample is representative in
terms of the responses to questions that we asked. We then examined differences
in responses to our outcome variables for respondents that required a second
round of surveys to respond and those respondents that indicated that they had
no interest in grasses or woody crops for energy production. The full analysis of
nonresponse can be found in the Appendix.
The comparison of the respondent’s characteristics to those in the study pop-
ulation was limited due to the lack of population data on agricultural landowners.
The United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) Census of Agriculture re-
ports on all farms and while this does include landowners, it is difficult to separate
landowners from farmers for the study region with publicly available data.7 We
evaluate the crops grown in our study region with the results of our survey. We
find that our sample is similar to the population in terms of share of cropland
7A custom data request would be required to obtain census data from only landowners.
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used to grow crops (see Table A.1 in the Appendix). Our survey appeared to
over-sample landowners with soybean fields and under-sample landowners with
hay fields.
Examining the response round is a common technique in social science re-
search to better understand the nonrespondents (Lindner, Murphy, and Briers,
2001). Respondents to survey rounds two and above are non-respondents to the
previous rounds. In our survey, 37% of the respondents were from the second
round of surveys. We found no significant difference in response to our four out-
come variables between respondents from round 2 and round 1 (see Table A.2 in
the Appendix).
Previous research has shown that some of the nonrespondents may not be
interested in perennial bioenergy. We are able to identify differences between
respondents that have no interest in either grasses or woody crops and those that
have at least some interest in either by including questions to gauge their level
of interest. Not surprisingly, we found a significantly greater willingness (41%)
to produce both grasses and woody crops among landowners with at least some
interest (see Table A.3 in the Appendix). When we estimate this difference at the
treatment amounts, we see that the magnitude of this difference is highest at the
$50 and $100 per acre relative net income amounts. This low difference is due to
the low willingness of interested landowners at the negative relative net income
amounts and the high willingness of uninterested landowners at high relative net
incomes. We found no significant difference in the amount of acres for perennial
bioenergy production between the landowners that were interested versus those
that were not.
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2.3.2 Summary Statistics
In order to better understand the willingness of landowners to supply perennial
bioenergy crops, we report on the effect of a variety of variables on adoption. This
includes land tenure, land use, income, conservation experience and demographics.
Treatments
Table 2.1a summarizes the frequency of the grass and woody crop amounts. The
sample received a balanced set of treatments with a 1 in 8 probability (p) of
receiving a particular grass (g) or woody crop (t) amount and a 1 in 64 probability
(pgpt) of receiving a particular set of grass and woody crop amounts. With a
response rate (n) of 419, the expected frequency (pgptn) of a set of grass and
woody crop amounts is 6.55. The response rates (ng,t) are unbalanced but do not
have any statistical relationship to the treatment amount. We also conducted the
Pearson’s chi-squared test8 of the independence of the woody crop response rate
to the grass response rate. We failed to reject the null hypothesis that the grass
and woody crop response rates are independent. Thus, there is no evidence that
the response rate was different based on the treatment amounts.
Willingness to Supply
The willingness to supply perennial bioenergy questions asked the respondents if
they would grow perennial bioenergy crops if their annual net farm income per acre
from growing perennial bioenergy crops was a randomly selected amount greater
or lower than their current net farm income per acre. The randomly selected
amount ranged from -$ 100 to $ 250 for perennial grasses and -$ 50 to $ 300 for
8The Pearson’s chi-squared test is χ2 = n
∑
g,t pgpt
( ng,t
n −pgpt
pgpt
)2
.
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Table 2.1a: Summary Statistics: Number of Responses by Treatment
Woody Crop Relative Net Income acre−1 (RNI)
Grass RNI -$50 $0 $50 $100 $150 $200 $250 $300 Total
-$100 6 5 7 8 6 6 9 4 51
-$50 5 3 11 6 5 9 5 5 49
$0 10 9 8 6 7 1 7 8 56
$50 7 5 6 6 7 8 8 3 50
$100 4 6 8 10 11 7 5 7 58
$150 4 6 4 8 9 6 6 8 51
$200 12 7 4 7 4 8 6 8 56
$250 2 5 9 4 6 6 9 7 48
Total 50 46 57 55 55 51 55 50 419
Pearson χ2(49) = 44.750 Pr = 0.646
woody crops at $ 50 increments.
Some (17%) of the respondents were willing to supply perennial grasses at
negative relative net incomes (RNI) per acre (Table 2.1b). The willingness to
supply jumped 45% at the RNI equal to their current net income ($ 0). In most
studies that ask farmers directly, less than half (25-45%) indicate that they would
be willing to produce perennial bioenergy crops (Fewell and Lynes, 2013; Caldas
et al., 2014; Wen et al., 2009; Jensen et al., 2007). The percentage of respondents
and the acreage was non-decreasing in relative net incomes. The variation in the
acreage between studies was surprisingly low, with most studies between 60-70
acres (Jensen et al., 2007; Wen et al., 2009; Qualls et al., 2012). Given the different
study populations and average farm sizes, this acreage translates to 16-24% of
farmed acres. Almost no respondents (4%) were willing to supply woody crops
at net incomes less than their current net income. The percentage of respondents
and the acreage was non-decreasing in relative net incomes for tress as well. At
all amounts, the percentage of respondents willing to supply perennials was lower
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Table 2.1b: Summary Statistics: Willingness to Produce Grasses
Yes Acres|Yes† Acres†
RNI Mean Grp.‡ Mean SD Grp.‡ Mean SD Grp.‡
-$100 0.16 a 30 17 a 4 12 a
-$50 0.18 a 36 32 ab 5 17 a
$0 0.63 b 76 68 ab 42 63 b
$50 0.70 bc 69 64 ab 44 61 bc
$100 0.72 bc 66 53 a 44 53 bc
$150 0.69 bc 74 69 ab 48 65 bc
$200 0.79 bc 86 92 ab 64 87 bc
$250 0.81 c 113 189 ab 73 161 c
Total 0.59 77 96 41 80
N 419 222 419
† Acres|Yes is the average acres for respondents that were willing to
produce perennials. Acres is the average acres for all respondents
assuming zero acres for respondents unwilling to produce perennials.
‡ The null hypothesis that the means are equal can be rejected for
models with different letters
for woody crops than for grasses.
Design: The majority of the respondents responded to the first round of surveys.
The second round of surveys included an additional 158 responses. The sampling
frame (i.e., county tax record addresses) was constructed by aggregating records
by county. The response rates can be found in Table 2.1d. These response rates
match with the share of the population in each county.
Land Tenure: Table 2.1e summarizes land tenure for the respondents in the sur-
vey. Using the information from the county tax records, we included landowners
with parcels 20 acres or larger to limit homesteads that are zoned for agriculture
but not used for that purpose. We received nine questionnaires from respondents
that owned fewer than 20 acres of land. These responses were removed from
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Table 2.1c: Summary Statistics: Willingness to Produce Woody Crops
Yes Acres|Yes† Acres†
RNI Mean Grp.‡ Mean SD Grp.‡ Mean SD Grp.‡
-$50 0.04 a 12 4 ab 0 3 a
$0 0.39 ab 29 23 a 11 20 ab
$50 0.42 ab 32 31 a 13 25 abc
$100 0.45 ab 44 42 ab 18 34 bc
$150 0.53 ab 48 35 ab 22 33 bc
$200 0.47 ab 68 66 b 27 53 cd
$250 0.55 ab 43 52 ab 20 41 bc
$300 0.60 b 70 76 b 40 67 d
Total 0.43 48 52 19 40
N 419 163 419
† Acres|Yes is the average acres for respondents that were willing to
produce perennials. Acres is the average acres for all respondents
assuming zero acres for respondents unwilling to produce perennials.
‡ The null hypothesis that the means are equal can be rejected for
models with different letters
Table 2.1d: Summary Statistics: Design of Survey
Variable Description Mean
Round 2 Landowner responded to the second round of surveys
(0,1)
0.38
County
Blue Earth
Share of respondents from each county (0,1)
0.19
Sibley 0.15
Le Suer 0.13
Brown 0.12
Carver 0.12
Martin 0.11
Nicollet 0.08
Watonwan 0.07
Scott 0.05
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Table 2.1e: Summary Statistics: Land Tenure and Land Use (acres)
Variable Description Mean Std. Dev.
Tenure
Owned Total acres owned 217 213
Rented Acres rented or sharecropped from other
landowners
86.1 269
Farmed Total acres farmed. Equals zero for landown-
ers that do not farm.
199 367
Land Use
Wildlife Wildlife habitat acres 5.1 20.0
Alfalfa 5.4 18.0
Pasture Pasture livestock area 3.4 15.8
Wetland 3.7 14.2
Recreation Recreation acres, such as hunting or bird
watching
2.8 12.1
Woods Wooded acres 1.4 11.2
Native Prairie 2.1 10.3
Hay Hay Acres, not including alfalfa 1.8 6.6
Orchards 0.06 0.64
SRWC Woody Crops 0.03 0.49
CRP Acres enrolled in the Conservation Reserve
Program
0.34 0.47
the sample to match the sampling methodology. Of the 419 landowners that re-
sponded, they owned an average of 217 acres of land. About half (51%) leased
or sharecropped their land to other farmers and about one-quarter (24%) rented
land. Just over half (55%) of the respondents farmed land they owned or rented.
The landowners that did farm had an average farm size of 361 acres.
Land Use: Table 2.1e summarizes the current land uses of the respondents.
Most of the respondents in these counties had corn (92%) and soybean (84%)
being produced on the land they owned. Other common agricultural uses included
alfalfa (17%), hay (14%), and pasture (14%). Common non-agricultural land uses
are wildlife habitat (19%), recreation (11%), and native prairie (8%). Land leased
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Table 2.1f: Summary Statistics: Conservation Programs & Practices
Variable Description Mean
CRP Has implemented a conservation easement on the
land such as Conservation Reserve Program (0,1)
0.34
CSP Has implemented a government conservation pro-
gram that conserves resources while farming such
as the Conservation Security Program (0,1)
0.09
Soil Conservation Has implemented soil conservation practices such as
no-till/low-till, direct seeding, or nutrient manage-
ment (0,1)
0.44
to other farmers was collected in the survey but not used in this study because
land leased is a linear combination of the other land tenure variables.
Conservation: Table 2.1f summarizes the implementation of conservation pro-
grams or practices on the respondent’s land. Most of the respondents (61%)
indicated that they had implemented one of the three conservation programs
or practices. Generic soil conservation practices such as no-till/low-till, direct
seeding, or nutrient management was the most common conservation program or
practice, with about half of the respondents (44%) indicating they had imple-
mented such a practice. Conservation tillage is becoming a common practice in
corn and soybean fields. Just over one-third (34%) of the respondents received
a conservation easement such as those available from the Conservation Reserve
Program (CRP). Only some of the landowners (9%) had enrolled in a government
conservation program that conserves natural resources while farming such as the
Conservation Security Program (CSP).
Demographics: Table 2.1g summarizes the demographic characteristics of the
respondents. Most of the respondents to the survey are male. Our estimates of
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Table 2.1g: Summary Statistics: Demographics
Variable Description Mean
Male Gender of landowner is male (0,1) 0.79
Age Age of landowner 59.75
(18.45)
Work Off Farm Someone in the landowner’s household works off-
the-farm (0,1)
0.55
Education Highest level of formal education landowner has
completed
Some high school Some high school or less (0,1) 0.06
High School High school/GED (0,1) 0.33
Some College Some College (0,1) 0.14
2 year degree Technical/Community college degree (0,1) 0.18
Bachelor’s Bachelor’s degree (0,1) 0.16
Graduate Graduate/Professional degree (0,1) 0.11
No answer Did not answer the question (0,1) 0.03
the share of female respondents is higher than other similar research that surveyed
farm operators. The average age (60) of the respondents and the share that has
someone in the household working off the farm (55%) matches closely to other
research. Just under half of our respondents (45%) had completed a college degree.
Income: Table 2.1h summarizes the household and farm incomes of the survey
respondents. Just under half of the respondents had household incomes under
$75,000. Median net farm income was in the range of $10,000-25,000. Net cash
farm income in the United States in 2009 was the lowest in the years 2008 and
2014.
Interest: Table 2.2 summarizes interest of the respondents in perennial crops,
assuming that they were financially competitive with current land usage, using a
Likert Scale. Most of the respondents (68%) had at least some interest in growing
grasses for perennial bioenergy. This matches closely with other research where
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Table 2.1h: Summary Statistics: Income
Variable Description Mean†
Household Income Total household income from all sources, before
taxes, in 2009.
less than $25,000 (0,1) 0.06
$25,000-50,000 (0,1) 0.22
$50,000-75,000 (0,1) 0.19
$75,000-100,000 (0,1) 0.15
$100,000-150,000 (0,1) 0.14
more than $150,000 (0,1) 0.12
No answer Did not answer this question (0,1) 0.11
Farm Income Net cash farm income from farm operations in
2009, including rental income
Net Loss Less than $0, Net Loss (0,1) 0.05
$0-5,000 (0,1) 0.13
$5,000-10,000 (0,1) 0.13
$10,000-25,000 (0,1) 0.27
$25,000-50,000 (0,1) 0.17
more than $50,000 (0,1) 0.15
No answer Did not answer this question (0,1) 0.11
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Table 2.2: Summary Statistics: Interest in Perennial Bioenergy Crops
Variable Description Mean
Interest Grass
No (0,1) 0.11
Little (0,1) 0.18
Some (0,1) 0.40
High (0,1) 0.20
No answer Did not answer the question (0,1) 0.11
Interest Woody Crop
No (0,1) 0.24
Little (0,1) 0.24
Some (0,1) 0.32
High (0,1) 0.14
No answer Did not answer the question (0,1) 0.06
the majority of farmers (67-75%) indicated that they are interested in converting
to dedicated biofuels including switchgrass (Kelsey and Franke, 2009; Qualls et al.,
2012). Overall, landowners were less interested in woody crops than grasses.
2.3.3 Estimated Model
This research included primary data collection using a randomized crop choice
survey. We collected information on co-variates in addition to the randomized
treatments. The collection of co-variates increases the efficiency of our treatment
effects, given that an effect exists. It also allows for the estimation of the effect that
the observable co-variates have on the willingness to produce perennial bioenergy
crops. The variables that are included in this model were chosen based on the
types of variables that have been included in similar research. In the reported
model, each variable is included in all four equations (see B.1). The one exception
is the interest variables, which is only included in the selection equations to allow
for Heckman sample selection correction (see 2.2.2 Regression).
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Error Correlation
In addition to the variables, mixed-process multivariate regression is flexible enough
to allow for various error correlation structures. This includes the error correlation
between the acreage and the selection equation which is the simultaneous Heckman
correction. The reported model follows the MANCOVA procedure and includes
no restrictions on the error correlations. Table 2.3 shows the log-likelihood values
for models with various combinations of restrictions on the error correlations. The
upper left model is the most restricted, having no error correlation. The lower
right model is the unrestricted model. The models without the restrictions on the
error correlation between the two willingness to produce equations and the two
acreage equations have a better fit than the models with the restrictions. The
other two restrictions have mixed results.
Table 2.4 is the variance and error correlation matrix for the errors. The errors
for the willingness to produce grass and woody crop are positively correlated
as are the errors for grass and woody crop acreage. This suggests that there
are unobservable variables that are correlated with both grass and woody crop
willingness and another set of unobservable variables that are correlated with both
grass and woody crop acreage. The willingness to produce grasses and woody crop
acreage are negatively correlated.
Treatment Effects
Using the unrestricted model, we report the marginal effects of the treatments
on the dependent variables. The marginal effects for the variables in the acres
equations is the marginal effect with the Heckman correction. The estimated
coefficients can be found in Table B.1 in the Appendix. We also test the joint
significance of the treatments on the model using the log-likelihood ratio test.
28
Table 2.3: Log-Likelihood Values with Various Restrictions on the Error Correla-
tion
ρGt = ρTg = 0
ρGg = ρTt = 0 ρGg = ρTt = 0
ρGT = ρgt = 0 -2401.46 a -2398.02 c -2399.61 a
-2385.89 b -2384.52 b -2383.81 bd -2381.31 d
† The null hypothesis that the models are equal can be rejected at the 95% level (likelihood
ratio test) for models that have different letters; the likelihood ratio test is only valid for
models in which one model can be nested within the other.
Table 2.4: Variance & Error Correlation for Unrestricted Model
Grasses Woody Crops
Yes Acres Yes Acres
Grass Yes 1.00
(.)
Acres −0.55 63 ***
(0.51) (11)
Woody Crop Yes 0.60*** −0.16 1.00
(0.09) (0.17) (.)
Acres −0.37** 0.29* −0.44 39.7***
(0.13) (0.14) (0.24) (4.8)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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The RNI for grasses is jointly significant at the 0.001 level. It has a significant
effect on the probability of producing grasses and the grass acreage. For each
$100 increase in the relative net income from grasses, the probability of planting
grasses increases by 15% and the grass acreage increases by 21 acres.
The RNI for woody crops is jointly significant at the 0.001 level. RNI has a
significant effect on the probability of producing woody crops and the woody crop
acreage. For each $100 increase in the relative net income from woody crops the
probability of planting woody crops increases by 12% and the woody crop acreage
increases by 14 acres.
The interaction between the grass and woody crop RNIs is not statistically
significant. This suggests that the marginal effects of the treatments do not de-
pend on the level of the other treatments. However, we do see a significant and
negative effect of the grass net income on the probability of producing woody
crops. The sum of the marginal effect of the grass and woody crop net income on
the probability of producing woody crops is not significantly different from zero.
What this suggests is that an increase in only the woody crop amount increases
the probability of producing woody crops. However, the same marginal increase
in relative net income for grass and woody crops or a decrease in the net income
for their current crop does not increase the probability of producing woody crops.
This suggests that landowners are also evaluating the relative returns between
grasses and woody crops.
Co-Variates
Design: The design of the survey had some effect on the outcome. The counties
were jointly significant. The sampling frame was obtained by aggregating county
tax records obtained county by county. The difference in the records from county
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Table 2.5a: Marginal Effects of the Treatments and Design
Grasses Woody Crops Joint LRT
Variable Yes Acres Yes Acres df χ2
Treatments
Grass net income‡ 0.15*** 21.0* −0.085** −0.8 4 51.40***
(0.026) (8.8) (0.030) (5.9)
Woody Crop net income‡ 0.02 3.4 0.12*** 14.0** 4 37.68***
(0.021) (6.2) (0.022) (5.3)
Interaction‡ 0.007 −0.5 0.029* 1.6 4 2.99
(0.017) (4.4) (0.017) (3.1)
Design
Round 2 −0.017 −2.8 0.018 −13.9* 4 4.34†
(0.043) (9.2) (0.043) (7.1)
County Yes Yes Yes Yes 32 60.83**
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
† Joint t-test reported due to lack of convergence of restricted model
‡ Treatments have been scaled by dividing the relative net income amounts by $100.
to county and any unobserved county level effect is controlled by including the
county fixed effects. The round of the survey response was not jointly significant
suggesting that later respondents did not differ from earlier respondents.
Land Tenure: Three tenure variables – area owned, rented, and farmed – are
included as co-variates. Area leased is not included because it is a linear combi-
nation of the three included variables.9 All three tenure co-variates are significant
at the 0.001 level. Tenure had no significant effect on the probability of produc-
ing grass. It did have an effect on the probability of producing woody crops.
Agricultural landowners that own or rent more land are more likely to produce
woody crops while those that farm more acres are less likely to do so. Tenure
acreage had a significant impact on grass and woody crop acres. This effect was
not significantly different for owned versus rented land. There was a significant
9Area leased equals area owned plus area rented minus area farmed.
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difference in the marginal effect of area owned and rented on grass and woody
crop acres. Landowners are willing to have 17% more land in grass than woody
crops production.
Land Use: Current land uses may affect the willingness of landowners to pro-
duce perennial bioenergy crops. Landowners that already have perennial land
uses may be more willing to produce perennial bioenergy crops or they maybe
willing to produce more acres. Farmers that own haying equipment or produce
hay were more interested in producing switchgrass (Qualls et al., 2012; Fewell and
Lynes, 2013). However, those that raised beef or dairy cattle were less interested
(Qualls et al., 2012). The current area of SRWC is a jointly significant co-variate.
Landowners that have SRWC are willing to expand the area 14-fold (current area
is very small). Landowners with pasture are willing to produce more woody crop
acreage. Landowners with wetlands are more willing to produce woody crops and
more grass acreage. This is likely because of non-productive nature of wetlands
and high water table near wetlands making annual crop production a challenge.
Landowners are willing to produce fewer acres of grass if they have CRP or wooded
areas. Removing land from CRP can have large penalties and CRP provides rental
payments. Converting wooded area to grasses can be costly and the wooded areas
may be valuable to the landowner. Landowners with recreation areas are more
willing to produce woody crops. This may mean that woody crops are more com-
patible with recreation activities (e.g., hunting, off-road vehicles) or that people
that dedicate land to recreation are more interested in woody crops.
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Table 2.5b: Marginal Effects of Tenure and Land Use Area (Acres)
Grasses Woody Crops Joint LRT
Variable Yes Acres Yes Acres df χ2
Tenure
Area Owned 0.00006 0.28*** 0.00025* 0.11** 4 27.19***†
(0.00015) (0.032) (0.00015) (0.036)
Area Rented −0.00001 0.27*** 0.00072*** 0.10** 4 40.28***†
(0.00018) (0.039) (0.00020) (0.033)
Area Farmed −0.00001 −0.22*** −0.00048** −0.10*** 4 34.20***†
(0.00015) (0.031) (0.00016) (0.028)
Land Use
SRWC 0.0016 6.6 0.047 14.0* 4 17.68**
(0.073) (7.9) (0.21) (7.5)
Hay −0.0027 −1.4 −0.0063 0.04 4 6.94
(0.0033) (1.0) (0.0040) (0.88)
Alfalfa −0.0017 −0.19 −0.0006 −0.04 4 2.08
(0.0013) (0.34) (0.0014) (0.26)
Pasture 0.0007 0.20 −0.00085 0.39* 4 11.60*
(0.0012) (0.27) (0.0014) (0.22)
Orchards −0.0014 6.9 0.024 0.6 4 6.41
(0.041) (8.8) (0.040) (5.6)
Wetland −0.0004 1.90*** 0.0040** 0.028 4 12.83*
(0.0020) (0.31) (0.0015) (0.23)
CRP 0.0046 −0.81* 0.0002 −0.08 4 20.66***
(0.0057) (0.43) (0.0014) (0.21)
Woods −0.0004 −1.38** −0.0012 −0.08 4 7.88*
(0.0030) (0.53) (0.0018) (0.46)
Recreation 0.0005 −0.59 0.0053** 0.12 4 12.99*
(0.0018) (0.37) (0.0020) (0.27)
Native Prairie 0.00001 0.45 0.0005 0.14 4 1.70
(0.0020) (0.52) (0.0018) (0.38)
Wildlife 0.0003 −0.54** −0.0022 −0.20 4 6.85
(0.0011) (0.19) (0.0014) (0.19)
Standard errors calculated using the delta method and are in parentheses; * p < 0.10,
** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
† Joint t-test reported due to lack of convergence of restricted model
33
Table 2.5c: Marginal Effects of Conservation
Grasses Woody Crops Joint LRT
Variable Yes Acres Yes Acres df χ2
CRP 0.010 −12.0 −0.028 0.1 4 1.57
(0.046) (15.4) (0.053) (9.5)
CSP −0.010 −10.1 0.13* −16.0 4 9.21*
(0.057) (15.5) (0.063) (14.3)
Soil Conservation 0.006 12.1 −0.059 −10.6 4 5.42
(0.042) (9.5) (0.042) (8.8)
Standard errors calculated using the delta method and are in parentheses; *
p < 0.10, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
† Joint t-test reported due to lack of convergence of restricted model
Conservation: Given the conservation benefit of perennial crops, a landowner’s
conservation experience may affect their willingness to produce perennial bioen-
ergy crops. Based on our results, we find very little evidence of this. Landown-
ers that have participated in the Conservation Stewardship Program (CSP) were
more willing to produce woody crops. Woody crops are a common component in
the CSP practices. Landowners with woody crops planted through CSP may be
more interested in planting additional woody crops on their land or possibly even
making productive use out of land in the CSP.
Demographics: Previous research has identified demographic variables that
are correlated with the interest and willingness of farmers to produce perennial
bioenergy crops. Similar to previous research, we found that males have a higher
probability of adopting both grasses and woody crops. Age of the respondent had
a negative or no effect in previous research. We found no significant effect of age
on willingness to produce perennials or the quantity of perennial acreage. Most
extant research has found a positive effect of education on willingness to adopt
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but does not control for household income (Caldas et al., 2014; Qualls et al.,
2012; Jensen et al., 2007). We find that education does not impact landowner
willingness to produce. This is consistent with other research that controls for
household income level.
Income: Income level of respondents is an important covariate because it affects
aversion to risk, liquidity constraints, and the opportunity cost of perennials. In
this research, we have included both farm income and household income. Pre-
vious research has included off-farm income, net farm income or neither. Qualls
et al. (2012) found that interest in perennial bioenergy crops was increasing in
off-farm income. Jensen et al. (2007) found that farmers with higher net farm
income indicated that they would convert less land to switchgrass. We find a
jointly significant effect of both household and farm income on willingness to pro-
duce perennial bioenergy crops and acreage. Willingness to produce grasses is
non-decreasing in household income. There are two groups of jointly significant
incomes: respondents with household income of less than $75,000 and those with
a household income of more than $75,000.10 Agricultural landowners with less
than $75,000 in annual household income are less willing to produce perennial
bioenergy crops. Farm income has no significant effect on willingness but has a
significant and non-decreasing effect on acreage. In other research, higher off-farm
income was associated with higher willingness to produce (Caldas et al., 2014).
There were five jointly significant farm income groups. Each income level was
jointly significantly different from the non-adjacent groups.11
10Respondents that did not answer were not significantly different than any of the household
income levels.
11Respondents that did not answer were not significantly different than any of the farm income.
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Table 2.5d: Marginal Effects of Demographics
Grasses Woody Crops Joint LRT
Variable Yes Acres Yes Acres df χ2
Male 0.12* −0.064 0.16** −17.2 4 11.23*
(0.057) (13.7) (0.049) (14.5)
Age 0.00003 −0.086 −0.0018 −0.35 4 2.44
(0.0015) (0.40) (0.0017) (0.33)
Work off farm −0.050 2.05 0.022 −11.5 4 7.79*
(0.046) (12.4) (0.043) (7.47)
Education 24 27.56
Group‡
Some high school 0 0 0 0 a
(.) (.) (.) (.)
High School −0.014 −12.0 0.013 29.3* a
(0.082) (19.0) (0.096) (14.7)
Some College −0.052 4.8 0.073 30.3 a
(0.093) (18.2) (0.10) (19.4)
2 year degree 0.057 −5.5 −0.004 26.0* a
(0.084) (24.1) (0.10) (14.8)
Bachelor’s −0.027 −4.4 0.05 14.4 a
(0.091) (24.5) (0.10) (15.4)
Graduate 0.045 −14.7 −0.01 9.9 a
(0.096) (24.8) (0.11) (16.5)
No answer 0.11 28.4 −0.10 33.6 a
(0.20) (74.5) (0.18) (28.4)
Standard errors calculated using the delta method and are in parentheses; * p < 0.10,
** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
† Joint t-test reported due to lack of convergence of restricted model
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Table 2.5e: Marginal Effects of Income
Grasses Woody Crops Joint LRT
Variable Yes Acres Yes Acres df χ2
Household Income 24 40.97*
Group‡
less than $25,000 0 0 0 0 a
(.) (.) (.) (.)
$25,000-50,000 0.11 −1.9 −0.060 8.3 a
(0.084) (16.6) (0.091) (13.7)
$50,000-75,000 0.16* −8.2 −0.069 19.3 a
(0.087) (18.8) (0.097) (18.9)
$75,000-100,000 0.27** 4.5 0.065 6.3 b
(0.088) (22.0) (0.100) (15.1)
$100,000-150,000 0.25** 16.4 −0.027 26.1 b
(0.092) (24.8) (0.10) (19.4)
more than $150,000 0.22* 44.8* 0.068 28.0* b
(0.11) (21.0) (0.11) (15.7)
No answer 0.23* 15.0 −0.032 −15.4 ab
(0.11) (28.1) (0.12) (20.1)
Farm Income 24 45.40**
Group‡
Net Loss 0 0 0 0 a
(.) (.) (.) (.)
$0-5,000 −0.01 40.7 0.026 43.7* ab
(0.10) (28.9) (0.089) (19.7)
$5,000-10,000 0.092 50.6* 0.00 60.6** bc
(0.10) (28.3) (0.091) (19.5)
$10,000-25,000 −0.026 62.1* 0.020 51.2* cd
(0.094) (31.5) (0.081) (21.7)
$25,000-50,000 −0.093 61.8* 0.13 83.8*** de
(0.094) (32.6) (0.092) (19.9)
more than $50,000 −0.068 52.1 0.096 58.4** e
(0.10) (38.7) (0.099) (21.7)
No answer −0.13 39.7 −0.018 49.3 abcde
(0.12) (42.3) (0.12) (36.0)
Standard errors calculated using the delta method and are in parentheses; * p < 0.10,
** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
† Likelihood-ratio test (LRT)
‡ The joint null hypothesis that the coefficients in all four equations are equal can be
rejected for responses with different letters.
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Interest: Previous research has used both willingness and interest as depen-
dent variables to estimate the impact of explanatory variables. In this research,
we ask respondents to indicate their interest before they are presented with the
treatments. We then use interest as an explanatory variable for three reasons.
First, willingness to produce is a more direct question and should match closer to
revealed preferences. Interest in perennial bioenergy crops (Kelsey and Franke,
2009; Qualls et al., 2012) is usually greater than willingness to produce. Second,
previous research, which has examined non-respondents, has found that some of
the non-respondents had no interest in perennial bioenergy crops. These non-
respondents will bias willingness results upwards. To determine the magnitude of
the bias, we need to estimate the effect of no interest on willingness to produce.
Third, in order to estimate our model with simultaneous Heckman corrections, we
need to include an explanatory variable in our willingness to produce equations
that is not in our acreage equations. Interest is highly correlated with willingness
to produce but not with acreage and so it is a good candidate for this purpose.
Table 2.5f summarizes the marginal effect of interest on willingness to pro-
duce. An increase in the level of interest in each type of perennial bioenergy crop
increases the willingness to produce that type of perennial bioenergy crop. A
landowner with some interest in grasses (woody crops) would be 32% (32%) more
willing to produce grasses (woody crops) and would produce 23.8 (16.1) acres
more than a landowner with no interest. Interest levels in grasses has a similar
effect on grass willingness to produce as interest levels in woody crops has on
woody crop willingness to produce.
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Table 2.5f: Marginal Effects of Interest
Grasses Woody Crops Joint LRT
Variable Yes Acres Yes Acres df χ2
Interest
Grass 16 47.70***
Group
No 0 0 0 0 a
(.) (.) (.) (.)
Little 0.055 4.8 −0.18* −9.46* b
(0.098) (8.8) (0.088) (4.5)
Some 0.32*** 23.8** 0.060 2.54 c
(0.092) (7.7) (0.083) (3.6)
High 0.47*** 32.7*** 0.13 5.41 c
(0.14) (9.3) (0.10) (4.3)
No answer 0.087 7.5 −0.054 −2.49 ab
(0.11) (9.0) (0.093) (4.3)
Woody Crop 16 51.1***
Group
No 0 0 0 0 a
(.) (.) (.) (.)
Little 0.14* 10.9* 0.26*** 13.9*** b
(0.063) (4.9) (0.063) (3.5)
Some 0.12* 9.0* 0.32*** 16.1*** b
(0.056) (4.4) (0.058) (3.3)
High 0.10 8.2 0.58*** 24.7*** c
(0.18) (13.3) (0.071) (3.4)
No answer 0.24** 17.5** 0.23* 12.8* b
(0.091) (6.2) (0.11) (5.2)
Standard errors calculated using the delta method and are in parentheses; * p < 0.10,
** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
† Joint t-test reported due to lack of convergence of restricted model
39
2.4 Conclusion
This study utilizes a stated choice approach to examine the willingness of agri-
cultural landowners to produce perennial bioenergy crops at the intensive and
extensive margins. With a lack of revealed preference data, we use a stated pref-
erence approach and randomly assign relative net returns to agricultural landown-
ers. We also analyze the effect of observable co-variates on willingness to produce
perennial bioenergy crops.
The findings show that agricultural landowners would be willing to produce
perennial bioenergy crops if financially competitive, but only on a portion of their
land.12 At the same net returns per acre as their current net returns, landowners
would supply 22% (5%) of their land for grasses (woody crops). The marginal
effect of relative net returns on the fraction of land supply is 0.015% (0.008%) for
grasses (woody crops). The implication of these results is that partial and general
equilibrium biomass supply models over-estimate biomass supply from perennial
crops. Landowner farmers are more willing to produce perennial bioenergy crops
but on less land than non-farmer landowners.
Given that agricultural landowners are willing to produce perennial bioenergy
crops, such as grasses, but only on a relatively small portion of their land, policies
to promote bioenergy must address production at the intensive margins. Future
research is needed to understand the underlying reasons why landowners are only
interested in production on a small area. One possible explanation for this is the
uncertainty and risk in producing a new crop. Policies that include production
incentives, such as per acre and price subsidies, will impact perennial bioenergy
production in different ways. Per acre subsidies will encourage more perennial
12Many models of biomass supply assume that when returns are greater for the bioenergy
crop all land is converted.
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acreage but will have no effect on the intensity of production. Price subsidies may
encourage more acreage and increase the intensity of production.
Chapter 3
A Conceptual Assessment of
Policies for Promoting Perennial
Bioenergy Crops
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3.1 Introduction
The expected utility model has been the primary workhorse in theoretical and
empirical research of production under uncertainty. A primary reason for this is
its simplicity and mathematical tractability. Additionally, empirical agricultural
production models using expected utility foundations provided better fit to ob-
served data than expected profit maximization models (Lin, Dean, and Moore,
1974). Unfortunately, expected utility has theoretical shortcomings as a positive
theory and is difficult to reconcile with subsequent empirical evidence (Schoe-
maker, 1982). For example, a farmer may evaluate a new crop or production
technology in reference to their current crop and production regime. In expected
utility, farmers reevaluate all options independent of the current regime.
Evidence also suggests that individuals seem to over-weight low probability
states and under-weight high probability states (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979).
Furthermore, probability may be an ambiguous concept for individuals. In the
case of a novel crop or production technology, farmers may have no basis to form
the probabilities of outcomes in different states of the world. Studies on perennial
bioenergy which allowed farmers to respond with uncertainty (i.e., “not sure” and
“don’t know”), show that farmers are uncertain (25%; 47%) regarding producing
perennial bioenergy crops (Wen et al., 2009; Jensen et al., 2007).
The state contingent approach is not subject to the same shortcomings as the
expected utility approach. Recent work by Chambers and Quiggin (2000) has
shown that many results from expected utility can be generalized by way of the
state contingent approach. Unlike the expected utility approach, this generaliza-
tion makes no assumptions about probabilities, allowing for subjective weighting
of possible states of the world. In addition to these positive advantages, the state
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contingent approach establishes a clearer association between the theory of pro-
duction with certainty (i.e., neoclassical approaches) and uncertainty. However,
gaps still remain.
One of these gaps is the neoclassical interpretation of the comparative price
effects. Using a Slutsky style approach, Hurley (2015) characterized the com-
parative price effects by decomposing them into substitution and scale effects.
Furthermore, by generalizing Nau’s (2003, 2003) uncertainty aversion coefficients
and creating new characterizations for uncertain technology and markets, Hurley
(2015) was able to show how a proportional increase in all prices affects optimal
input and output choice by revisiting Sandmo (1971).
We apply Hurley’s (2015) general “Slutskyesque” approach to crop choice to
understand the comparative static effects of three policy levers. Using the state-
contingent analogue to the Arrow-Pratt measure of relative risk aversion and
notions of relative uncertainty, we characterize the comparative static effects of
these three policy levers (i.e., establishment cost-share, per acre payments, and
price matching) on perennial acreage.
3.2 Analysis
We start out by describing the production function and the state-contingent
model. From this we can derive the optimality conditions and the comparative
static effect for a general policy lever. We then turn to the derivation of the suf-
ficient conditions for the three policy levers to increase perennial bioenergy crop
acerage.
The profit function is defined using state (s) dependent per acre profits (pq−c)
for a farmer’s current production system (c) and a perennial bioenergy crop (p).
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Per acre net revenue is price (ps) multiplied by quantity (qs) minus per acre costs
(cs). Total profits are perennial profits from production on perennial acreage (L
p)
plus current profits on available land (L¯), minus the opportunity cost of perennial
acreage. The profit function includes three policy levers: price subsidy (γ), per
acre subsidy (τ), and establishment subsidy (κ). We define the profit function as
(3.1)pis = L
p (ppsγq
p
s − cps + τ) +
(
L¯− Lp) (pcsqcs − ccs)−K + κ.
The farmer’s optimization problem is to choose the perennial acreage that maxi-
mizes his/her state contingent utility,
(3.2)max
L¯ ≤Lp≤0
W (pi)
where pi represents a vector of state-contingent profit and W (pi) is the utility of
state-contingent profit. W (pi) is assumed to be increasing in pis, continuous and
twice differentiable. Assuming an interior solution (L¯ > Lp > 0) the first order
condition is
(3.3)W ′ =
S∑
s=1
∂W (pi)
∂pis
∂pis
∂Lp
= 0
where
(3.4)
∂pis
∂Lp
= ppsq
p
sγ − cps + τ − (pcsqcs − ccs) .
Using the first order condition we can show that at the interior solution the
marginal benefits of perennial acreage must equal the marginal cost
(3.5)
S∑
s =1
∂W (pi)
∂pis
(ppsq
p
sγ − cps + τ) =
S∑
s =1
∂W (pi)
∂pis
(pcsq
c
s − ccs) .
Turning to the comparative static effects for the policy levers, we take the total
derivative of W ′ with respect to a general policy lever (α) which is
(3.6)
dW ′
dα
=
∂W ′
∂α
+
∂W ′
∂Lp
dLp∗
dα
for α = τ, γ, κ.
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Solving for dL∗/dα, the general comparative statistic can be written as
(3.7)
dLp∗
dα
= −
∂W ′
∂α
∂W ′
∂Lp∗
for α = τ, γ, κ
where
(3.8)
∂W ′
∂α
=
S∑
s=1
(
∂W (pi)
∂pis
∂2pis
∂L∂α
+
S∑
t=1
∂2W (pi)
∂pis∂pit
∂pis
∂L
∂pit
∂α
)
,
and
(3.9)
∂W ′
∂Lp∗
=
S∑
s=1
S∑
t=1
∂2W (pi)
∂pis∂pit
∂pis
∂L
∂pis
∂L
< 0
by second order sufficiency conditions. Therefore, the sign of the comparative
static of the policy is equal to the sign of ∂W
′
∂α
.
For convenience of notation, explanation, and graphical illustration and with-
out loss of generality we order the states from the lowest per acre perennial return
to the highest per acre perennial net return:
(3.10)s > s′ for all Rps ≥ Rps′
where Rps = p
p
sq
p
s − cps.
Some assumptions are necessary to proceed. We first need to assume that
states that are net revenue increasing for one crop are also net revenue increasing
for the other,
(3.11)∆Rpss′ ≥ 0 ⇐⇒ ∆Rcss′ ≥ 0 for all s
where
(3.12)∆Rss′ = psqsγ − cs − (ps′qs′γ − cs′) .
This assumes that states are also ordered for conventional crops by the per acre
net return (see figure 3.1a). If we think about states of the world in terms of
weather this assumption seems reasonable. States with good growing conditions
will be revenue increasing for both crops. This assumption may not hold if there is
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weather conditions in which one crop does better and the other worse (e.g., willows
perform well even in wet years and poorly drained soils). This assumption results
in the profits also being ordered by states.
We also need to make an additional assumption regarding the relative uncer-
tainty,
(3.13a)|∆Rpss′ | ≤ |∆Rcss′| for all s and s′ or
(3.13b)|∆Rpss′ | ≥ |∆Rcss′| for all s and s′,
which is a single crossing condition (see figure 3.1). The per acre profits may
not cross precisely at a particular state. Thus, define s− and s+ as the states
immediately before and after this crossing point. Equation 3.13 defines the relative
uncertainty between the per acre net returns for the two crops and assumes that
the uncertainty between any two states is always greater for one crop. Inequality
3.13a implies that uncertainty is greater for current crops. Inequality 3.13b implies
that uncertainty is greater for perennial crops. The latter seems more likely given
that farmers are familiar with their current crops, these crops are largely insured
and farmers have a broad range of management strategies to reduce uncertainty.
To facilitate the development of sufficiency conditions, we now define a state-
contingent analogue to the Arrow-Pratt measure of risk aversion (see figure 3.2)
and generalize the notion of relative risk by inclusion of a gradient (g). The
state-contingent analogue is
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Figure 3.1: Single Crossing Condition (This figure shows an example when uncer-
tainty is higher for perennial crops as in inequality 3.13b)
s
psqsγ − cs
c
p
(a) per acre profit by crop
s
∂pis
∂L
(b) marginal profit
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(3.14)ϕs (pi, g) = −
∑S
t=1 gs
∂2W (pi)
∂pis∂pit
∂W (pi)
∂pis
where
• If ϕs (pi, g) = ϕs′ (pi, g) = ϕ (pi, g) for all pis and pis′ , then we have an
analogue to constant relative risk aversion (CRRA).
• If ϕs (pi, g) > ϕs′ (pi, g) for all pis > pis′ , then we have an analogue to in-
creasing relative risk aversion (IRRA).
• If ϕs (pi, g) < ϕs′ (pi, g) for all pis > pis′ , then we have an analogue to de-
creasing relative risk aversion (DRRA).
In the the special case where the gradient is equal to one for all states (gs = 1
for all s) then we have the state-contingent analogues to the Arrow-Pratt measure
of absolute risk aversion:
• Constant Absolute Risk Aversion (CARA)
• Increasing Absolute Risk Aversion (IARA)
• Decreasing Absolute Risk Aversion (DARA)
3.2.1 Establishment Subsidy
We first start by evaluating the establishment subsidy. Using equation 3.8 and
noting that ∂
2pis
∂L∂κ
= 0 and ∂pit
∂κ
= 1, the sign of the effect of the establishment
subsidy on perennial acreage (κ) is
(3.15)
S∑
s =1
∂pis
∂L
S∑
t =1
∂2W (pi)
∂pis∂pit
.
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Figure 3.2: Relative Uncertainty Aversion
s
pis
s
ϕs
IRRA
DRRA
CRRA
gs
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CARA
Proposition 3.2.1 With CARA preferences, a perennial crop establishment sub-
sidy has no effect on the optimal perennial crop acreage.
In the case of CARA, expression 3.15 can be written as
(3.16)−ϕ (pi, g)
S∑
s =1
∂W (pi)
∂pis
∂pis
∂L
= 0
by the first order condition. Therefore, dL
∗
dκ
= 0 with CARA preferences. With
constant absolute risk aversion there is no indirect effect of increased profits on
perennial acreage. This result does not require the assumptions of equations 3.11
or 3.13.
IARA
Proposition 3.2.2 With IARA preferences and |∆Rps| ≤ (≥) |∆Rcs|, perennial
crop establishment subsidy will increase (decrease) optimal perennial crop acreage.
Here we evaluate the case of IARA. First we define the certain profit that is
greater than the profit at s− but less than the profit at s+,
(3.17)pis− ≤ pio ≤ pis+ ,
where
(3.18)pio = L ((p
p
oq
p
o − cpo)γ + τ) +
(
L¯− L) (pcoqco − cco)−K + κ.
Assuming inequality 3.13a and an interior solution there will be a certain per acre
perennial profit such that
(3.19)
∂pis
∂L
≤ 0 ⇐⇒ ppsqpsγ − cps ≥ ppoqpoγ − cpo.
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The marginal profit is negative when the conventional per acre returns are greater
than the perennial per acre returns and positive otherwise. Furthermore, assuming
statement 3.11,
(3.20)pis ≥ pi0 ⇐⇒ ppsqpsγ − cps ≥ ppoqpoγ − cpo .
IARA implies there exists ϕo such that ϕs ≥ (≤)ϕo ⇐⇒ pis ≥ (≤)pio. Using this
and statement 3.19 we have
(3.21a)ppsq
p
s − cps ≥ ppoqpo − cpo =⇒ ϕs
∂pis
∂L
≤ ϕo∂pis
∂L
and
(3.21b)ppsq
p
s − cps ≤ ppoqpo − cpo =⇒ ϕs
∂pis
∂L
≤ ϕo∂pis
∂L
,
so
(3.22)ϕs
∂pis
∂L
≤ ϕo∂pis
∂L
for all s.
Inequality 3.22 can be rewritten as
(3.23)
∂pis
∂L
S∑
t =1
∂2W (pi)
∂pis∂pit
≥ ϕo∂W (pi)
∂pis
∂pis
∂L
for all s.
Summing across all states this becomes
(3.24)
S∑
s =1
(
∂pis
∂L
S∑
t=1
∂2W (pi)
∂pis∂pit
)
≥
S∑
s=1
ϕo
∂W (pi)
∂pis
∂pis
∂L
but
(3.25)ϕo
S∑
s =1
∂W (pi)
∂pis
∂pis
∂L
= 0
by the first order conditions, such that
(3.26)
S∑
s =1
(
∂pis
∂L
S∑
t=1
∂2W (pi)
∂pis∂pit
)
≥ 0.
When the current crop returns are more uncertain than the returns from peren-
nials and the landowner has IARA preferences, the landowner will produce more
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perennials when given an establishment subsidy. This result will have the op-
posite sign if we assumed inequality 3.13b instead of inequality 3.13a. With an
increasing aversion to uncertainty a establishment subsidy will increase acres of
the crop with less uncertainty in returns.
DARA
Proposition 3.2.3 With DARA preferences and |∆Rps| ≤ (≥) |∆Rcs|, a perennial
crop establishment subsidy will decrease (increase) optimal perennial crop acreage.
Using the same logic as with IARA, inequality 3.22 for DARA will be
(3.27)ϕs
∂pis
∂L
≥ ϕo∂pis
∂L
for all s.
Therefore, the sign of dL
∗
dκ
will be negative. When the perennial crop returns
are more uncertain than current crop returns and the landowner has DARA, the
landowner will produce less perennials when given an establishment subsidy. This
result will have the opposite sign if we assumed equation 3.13b instead of equa-
tion 3.13a. With a decreasing aversion to uncertainty the establishment subsidy
will decrease acres of the crop with less uncertainty in returns.
3.2.2 Per Acre Subsidy
We now evaluate the per acre subsidy. This policy lever affects farmer’s preferences
and revenue uncertainty. Using equation 3.8 and noting that ∂
2pis
∂L∂τ
= 1 and ∂pit
∂τ
=
L∗ for the per acre subsidy, the sign of the effect of τ on the perennial acreage is
(3.28)
S∑
s =1
(
∂W (pi)
∂pis
+
∂pis
∂L
S∑
t=1
∂2W (pi)
∂pis∂pit
L∗
)
.
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CARA
Proposition 3.2.4 With CARA preferences a perennial crop per acre subsidy
will increase optimal perennial crop acreage.
In the case of CARA, expression 3.28 can be written as
(3.29)
S∑
s =1
∂W (pi)
∂pis
− L∗ϕ (pi)
S∑
s =1
∂W (pi)
∂pis
∂pis
∂L
.
Using the first order condition and the properties of the utility function this be-
comes
(3.30)
S∑
s =1
∂W (pi)
∂pis
≥ 0.
A per acre subsidy has no indirect effect when the farmer’s aversion to uncertainty
is constant. This result does not require the assumptions of statement 3.11 or
inequality 3.13.
IARA and DARA
Proposition 3.2.5 With DARA (IARA) preferences and |∆Rps| ≥ (≤) |∆Rcs|,
the per acre perennial crop subsidy will unambiguously increase optimal perennial
crop acreage.
IARA
We start from inequality 3.23. Multiplying by the optimal acreage (L∗) we have
(3.31)L∗
∂pis
∂L
S∑
t =1
∂2W (pi)
∂pis∂pit
≥ L∗ϕo∂W (pi)
∂pis
∂pis
∂L
for all s
Summing across all states this is
(3.32)
S∑
s =1
(
L∗
∂pis
∂L
S∑
t=1
∂2W (pi)
∂pis∂pit
)
≥ L∗ϕo
S∑
s=1
∂W (pi)
∂pis
∂pis
∂L
for all s
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but
(3.33)
S∑
s =1
∂W (pi)
∂pis
∂pis
∂L
= 0
by the first order conditions. Therefore
(3.34)
S∑
s =1
(
L∗
∂pis
∂L
S∑
t=1
∂2W (pi)
∂pis∂pit
)
≥ 0.
We also know that
(3.35)
S∑
s =1
∂W (pi)
∂pis
≥ 0,
such that
(3.36)
S∑
s =1
(
∂W (pi)
∂pis
+ L∗
∂pis
∂L
S∑
t=1
∂2W (pi)
∂pis∂pit
)
≥ 0.
When the uncertainty is higher for the landowner’s current crops than the peren-
nial crop, a per acre perennial subsidy will increase perennial acreage. If instead
we assume inequality 3.13b, then inequality 3.34 has the opposite sign and the
effect of the per acre subsidy on perennial acreage is ambiguous.
DARA
Combining the logic used in the DARA perennial establishment subsidy section
with that used in the IARA per acre perennial subsidy section, we have the oppo-
site result from IARA. When the uncertainty is lower for the landowner’s current
crops than the perennial crop, a per acre perennial subsidy will increase peren-
nial acreage. When the uncertainty is higher for the landowner’s current crops
than the perennial crop, a per acre perennial subsidy has an unknown effect on
perennial acreage.
For a per acre subsidy, the substitution effect is always positive. An increase in
returns for perennials will incentivize the farmer to substitute perennial acres for
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conventional acres. The indirect effect is positive when the change in preferences
due to the increases in profit is aligned with the relative uncertainty of the crops.
The indirect effect is negative when the change in preferences is not aligned with
the relative uncertainty of the crops. In this case, the comparative static effect is
ambiguous.
3.2.3 Price Subsidy
We now evaluate the comparative static effect of the price subsidy. Using equa-
tion 3.8 and noting that ∂
2pis
∂L∂τ
= ppsq
p
s and
∂pit
∂τ
= L∗ppsq
p
s for the per acre subsidy
the sign of the effect of γ on the perennial acreage is.
(3.37)
S∑
s =1
(
∂W (pi)
∂pis
ppsq
p
s + L
∗
S∑
t=1
∂pis
∂L
∂2W (pi)
∂pis∂pit
ppsq
p
s
)
CRRA
Proposition 3.2.6 With CRRA preferences ϕ (pi, g) where g˙s=p˙sq˙s, a peren-
nial crop price subsidy will increase optimal perennial crop acreage.
In the case of CRRA where the gradient is the per acre perennial revenue
(psqs), this becomes
(3.38)
S∑
s =1
∂W (pi)
∂pis
ppsq
p
s − L∗ϕ (pi, psqs)
S∑
s =1
∂pis
∂L
∂W (pi)
∂pis
.
By the first order conditions and the properties of the utility function this simpli-
fies to
(3.39)
S∑
s =1
∂W (pi)
∂pis
ppsq
p
s ≥ 0
Therefore, a price subsidy increases perennial acreage when the uncertainty aver-
sion is constant relative to the perennial crop revenue.
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IRRA and DRRA
Proposition 3.2.7 With DRRA (IRRA) preferences (ϕs (pi, g)) where g˙s=p˙sq˙s
and |∆Rps| ≥ (≤) |∆Rcs|, the perennial price crop subsidy will increase optimal
perennial crop acreage.
IRRA
Before we proceed we will need an assumption in addition to statement 3.11,
(3.40)∆Rps ≥ 0 ⇐⇒ ∆ppsqps ≥ 0 for all s .
This assumption says that the direction of change in net revenue must be the same
as the direction of change in revenue. A more restrictive assumption along these
lines is that the per acre perennial costs (cps) are not state dependent (c
p
s = c
p).
Using inequality 3.23, we have
(3.41)ppsq
p
s
∂pis
∂L
S∑
t =1
∂2W (pi)
∂pis∂pit
≥ pp0qpoϕo
∂W (pi)
∂pis
∂pis
∂L
for all s.
Multiplying by the optimal acreage (L∗), we have
(3.42)L∗ppsq
p
s
∂pis
∂L
S∑
t =1
∂2W (pi)
∂pis∂pit
≥ L∗pp0qpoϕo
∂W (pi)
∂pis
∂pis
∂L
for all s.
Summing across all states, yields
(3.43)
S∑
s =1
(
L∗ppsq
p
s
∂pis
∂L
S∑
t=1
∂2W (pi)
∂pis∂pit
)
≥ L∗pp0qpoϕo
S∑
s=1
∂W (pi)
∂pis
∂pis
∂L
for all s
but
(3.44)
S∑
s =1
∂W (pi)
∂pis
∂pis
∂L
= 0
by the first order conditions. Therefore
(3.45)
S∑
s =1
(
L∗ppsq
p
s
∂pis
∂L
S∑
t=1
∂2W (pi)
∂pis∂pit
)
≥ 0.
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We also know that
(3.46)
S∑
s =1
∂W (pi)
∂pis
ppsq
p
s ≥ 0,
therefore
(3.47)
S∑
s =1
(
∂W (pi)
∂pis
ppsq
p
s + L
∗
S∑
t=1
∂pis
∂L
∂2W (pi)
∂pis∂pit
ppsq
p
s
)
≥ 0.
When the uncertainty is higher for the landowner’s current crops than the peren-
nial crop, a perennial price subsidy will increase perennial acreage. If instead we
assume inequality 3.13b, then inequality 3.45 has the opposite sign and the effect
of the per acre subsidy on perennial acreage is unknown.
DRRA
Combining the logic used in the DARA perennial establishment subsidy section
with that used in the IRRA perennial price subsidy section, we have the oppo-
site result from IRRA. When the uncertainty is lower for the landowners current
crops than the perennial crop, a perennial price subsidy will decrease perennial
acreage. When the uncertainty is higher for the landowner’s current crops than
the perennial crop, a perennial price subsidy the effect is unknown.
For a price subsidy the substitution effect is always positive. An increase in
returns for perennials will incentivize the farmer to substitute perennial acres for
conventional acres. The indirect effect is positive when the change in preferences
due to the increases in profit is aligned with the relative uncertainty of the crops.
The indirect effect is negative when the change is preferences is not aligned with
the relative uncertainty of the crops. In this case, the comparative static effect is
ambiguous.
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3.3 Conclusion
We have characterized the comparative static effects of three policy levers for
increasing perennial crop acreage by decomposing this effect into a direct substi-
tution and indirect income effect using a state-contingent approach to crop choice.
For the establishment subsidy, the substitution effect is zero because there is no
opportunity to increase profits by changing the optimal perennial acreage. The
direction of the indirect effect depends on the relative uncertainty of the crops
and the uncertainty preferences. If the establishment subsidy decreases aversion
to uncertainty and the perennial crops is the more uncertain crop or it increases
aversion to uncertainty and the perennial crop is the less uncertain crop, then this
effect is positive, otherwise it is negative.
For the per acre and price subsidy, the comparative static effect is either pos-
itive or ambiguous. The substitution effect is always positive. That is to say that
higher perennial crop profits will incentivize farmers to produce more perennials
acres. Similar to the establishment subsidy, the indirect effect can be positive or
negative. This results in an ambiguous comparative static effect when the indirect
effect is negative. Farmers would like to substitute from conventional to perennial
crops for the additional profits but the uncertainty at this acreage allocation is
less preferred. In some cases, the indirect effect will just dampen the substitution
effect, reducing the effect of the policy to promote perennial bioenergy crops. In
others, a farmers preferences may be such that the increase in uncertainty aversion
due to the increased profit from the subsidy will result in a reduction in perennial
acreage. In this case, the farmer prefers less uncertainty to the increase in profits.
These results have interesting implications for policy meant to encourage peren-
nial bioenergy production. At the intensive margin, it is possible that the intended
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substitution from other crops to perennial will be muted by the uncertainty and
a farmers aversion to it. For some farmers, the subsidy may even decrease pro-
duction at the intensive margin because they prefer more certain profits to higher
returns. Therefore, policy makers who wish to support perennial crop production
must understand the implications of their policies in an uncertain world. Pol-
icy levers that reduce uncertainty in perennial crop returns may be necessary, in
conjunction with other incentives, to encourage adoption.
Chapter 4
An Empirical Analysis of the
Risks of Perennial Bioenergy
Crop Production
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4.1 Introduction
As a result of concerns over energy security and the environmental impacts of
fossil fuels, recent United States energy policy has included provisions to promote
renewable energy. In the transportation sector, which relies almost exclusively on
liquid fuels, renewable energy is based primarily on corn ethanol and soy biodiesel.
Therefore, policies encouraging renewable energy have driven demand for agricul-
tural commodities. This has resulted in a land-use shift from perennial conserva-
tion acres, pasture, and hay to annual field crops such as corn and soybean (U.
S. Department of Agriculture National Agricultural Statistics Service, 2014; U. S.
Department of Agriculture, 2013b; U. S. Department of Agriculture Farm Service
Agency, 2014). This change in land use has several environmental consequences
including increases in greenhouse gas emissions and reductions in water quality
(Fargione et al., 2008; Rajagopal et al., 2007).
The Energy Policy Act does include provisions for advanced biofuels from
cellulosic biomass (i.e., structural material of plants). However, commercial scale
production, which utilizes annual crop residues for its primary feedstock, has
been lagging far below the required production mandates. Cellulosic biofuels
from crop residues further increase the environmental impacts of US liquid fuels
energy policy by reducing surface residue (Lal, 2005).
Perennial bioenergy crops such as perennial grasses and woody crops are an
alternative source of feedstock for biofuel with lower environmental impacts than
their annual counterparts (Lemus and Lal, 2005; McLaughlin and Walsh, 1998).
Perennial bioenergy crops can mitigate the environmental impacts of changing
land use that has resulted from the Energy Policy Act and increase the sustain-
ability of U.S. energy policy.
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The 2008 Farm Bill included provisions to support biomass production on
agricultural land. The Biomass Crop Assistance Program (BCAP) provides pay-
ments for perennial production establishment, payments based on acreage, and
price matching payments. Eligible crop producers can receive reimbursements for
up to 75 percent of their establishment costs, up to five years of annual payments
and price matching up to $45 per dry ton.
Previous work (see chapter 2) has shown that, when perennial grasses are fi-
nancially competitive with a farmer’s current crops, a majority of farmers will
produce perennial grasses. However, they are only willing to plant perennials
on a small portion of their land. One potential explanation for this is the risk
posed by growing a new crop and selling it into a new emerging market (Just and
Zilberman, 1988). The relative magnitude of the risk can affect both the willing-
ness to produce and the number of acres. Crops that are financially competitive,
but pose greater risks than their current crops, will be tested in a small area as
part of a diversified production portfolio. This strategy will reduce aggregate risk
(Bocque´ho and Jacquet, 2010; Larson, English, and He, 2007).
New cropping regimes require a significant investment in both human capital
and capital goods. When the agronomics differ as widely as they do between
conventional and perennial bioenergy crops, large investments in the development
of human capital resources must be undertaken to successfully and optimally
manage the new system.
Understanding the magnitude of the risks and the fixed adoption costs can
help to better predict perennial supply and the impact of government policies. As
we noted in chapter 3, farmers’ preferences can limit the effect of subsidies and in
some cases, the effect is unknown.
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This study estimates the relative risk ratio and fixed adoption costs for peren-
nial grasses and woody crops by parameterizing a structural model of crop choice
under risk. Previous work has estimated perennial acreage using simulations of a
crop choice under risk framework (Bocque´ho and Jacquet, 2010; Larson, English,
and He, 2007). We use a similar structural model of crop choice under risk, but
estimate the parameters econometrically using data from a crop choice approach
of agricultural landowners from the Upper Mississippi River Basin.
We choose to develop and estimate a structural model, which has several ad-
vantages. First, it provides a theoretical explanation for the the choice of explana-
tory variables, including their interactions. Second, it provides for a behavioral
interpretation of the coefficients of these variables and their marginal effects as
it relates to crop choice under risk. Third, parameters of the crop choice model,
including the relative risk ratio and the fixed adoption costs can be estimated,
which is not possible with the reduced form approach. Fourth, using the struc-
tural relationship between the discrete and continuous variables, we can estimate
the variance of the error of the risk-adjusted profit. Fifth, using the simultaneous
Heckman correction and the nonlinear constraints, we can reduce the bias of the
results due to sample selection while increasing the efficiency of the estimator over
multi-step procedures.
4.2 Conceptual Model
We start by constructing an expected utility analogue to the more general model
in chapter 3 using the profit function as defined in this chapter. While the state-
contingent model has many conceptual advantages over the expected utility ap-
proach it lacks the mathematical traceability of expected utility. In addition the
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expected utility model still allows us to explore risk, a specific construct of un-
certainty. The expected utility model gives us an explicit solution for the risk
adjusted profit and the optimal acreage. Finally, we use these optimal conditions
to establish the comparative static effects of the policy levers, relative returns, and
available acreage (L¯). Assuming the per acre returns are random and distributed
normally p˜i ∼ N (pi, σ), and that the landowners have constant absolute risk aver-
sion (CARA) (U(p˜i) = 1− e−φp˜i where φ = −U ′′(w¯)/U ′(w¯)), we can transform the
utility function into the certainty equivalent model E(U) = pi− φ
2
σ2 using Freund
(1956), where σ2 is the variance of the profit. One change that we make from the
profit function in chapter 4 is to add non-monetary per acre net benefits.1 Our
certainty equivalent objective function is then,
(4.1)
max
Lp≥0
A=0,1
V = picL¯− φ
2
L¯2σ2c + A
[
(pip − pic)Lp + (b+ τ)Lp −K + κ
− φ
2
(
L2pγ
2σ2p + (L
2
p−2L¯Lp)σ2c + 2Lp
(
L¯−Lp
)
ργσpσc
)]
, s.t. Lp ≤ L¯.
We do not assume an interior solution and so A is the decision to produce perenni-
als or not. Following Just and Zilberman (1988), the solution to the maximization
problem is,
L∗p =

L¯ if A = 1 and V ′(L¯) ≥ 0
L˜p if A = 1 and V
′(L˜p) = 0
0 if A = 0
(4.2)
where L˜p = [pi
p − pic + b+ τ ]φ−1(σ2pγ2 +σ2c −2ρσpγσc)−1 + L¯(σ2c −ρσpγσc)(σ2pγ2 +
σ2c − 2ρσpγσc)−1 is the optimal perennial acreage with an interior solution and
L∗p is the optimal perennial acreage. Farmers will grow perennial bioenergy crops
1The non-monetary per acre net benefits are the non-pecuniary benefits per acre minus the
non-pecuniary benefits plus a misspecification parameter.
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(A = 1) when the risk adjusted profit is positive,
(4.3)
(pipγ − pic)Lp + (b+ τ)Lp − K + κ
− φ
2
(
L2pγ
2σ2p + (L
2
p − 2L¯Lp)σ2c + 2Lp
(
L¯− Lp
)
ργσpσc
)
> 0.
By assuming an interior solution equation 4.3 can be written as L˜2p
φ
2
Var(pip−pic) >
K − κ, where Var(pip − pic) = γ2σ2p + σ2c − 2ργσpσc. The left hand side is always
non-negative. Assuming the fixed costs of perennials minus the establishment
subsidy is positive K − κ > 0 then the farmer will not grow perennials (A = 0)
when L˜p <
√
2 K−κ
φVar(pip−pic) . Given the optimal interior solution the farmer must
produce enough perennial acreage so that the risk adjusted profits are greater
than the fixed costs of perennials.
4.2.1 Comparative Statics
In this section we determine the comparative static effects of the policy levers,
relative returns and the available acreage.
Establishment Subsidy: Given that we have assumed CARA, an establish-
ment subsidy does not effect the optimal perennial acreage (see chapter 3). This
is not a surprising result since we know that, with CARA, the risk aversion remains
constant as the level of profit changes.
Annual Subsidy, Non-pecuniary Benefits, Relative per acre returns:
We know from chapter 3 that a per acre subsidy has a positive impact on acreage
when the landowner has CARA preferences. There is no scale effect with CARA
preferences but there is a substitution from conventional to perennial bioenergy
crops with a per acre subsidy. Using the certainty equivalent approach, we can
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determine not only the direction of the effect but also the magnitude. Assuming
an interior solution the per acre subsidy effect on perennial acreage is
(4.4)
∂L˜p
∂τ
=
1
φ(γ2σ2p + σ
2
c − 2ργσpσc)
.
This value is always positive given that the individual is risk averse (φ > 0) and
γ2σ2p + σ
2
c − 2ργσpσc = Var(pip − pic) > 0. The comparative static effect is equal
to the effect of the non-monetary benefits and the relative per acre returns on
perennial acres, ∂L˜p
∂τ
= ∂L˜p
∂b
= ∂L˜p
∂(pip−pic) .
Land: The relationship between total acreage and perennial acreage is,
(4.5)
∂L˜p
∂L¯
=
σ2c − ρσcγσp
γ2σ2p + σ
2
c − 2ργσpσc
.
This value is positive when σc > ργσp and negative otherwise. Using ρ =
σcp
σcγσp
,
the comparative static effect of available land on perennial acreage is positive
when the variance of conventional returns is greater than the covariance of the
conventional and perennial returns (σ2c > σcp).
4.2.2 Relative Risks
Using equation 4.5 we can determine the relationship between the conventional
and perennial return risks:
(4.6)
(
∂L˜p
∂L¯
)−1
− 1 = γ
2σ2p − ργσpσc
σ2c − ρσcγσp
.
This is the perennial per acre return variance minus the conventional and perennial
per acre return covariance. If the correlation (ρ) is equal to zero, then this is the
ratio of the per acre return variances. If the correlation is equal to one, then this
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is the negative of the ratio of the standard deviations. If the correlation is equal
to minus one, then this is the ratio of the standard deviations.
If this ratio is greater than one, the perennial per acre profit risks are greater
than the current per acre profit risks (γ2σ2p > σ
2
c ). If this ratio is less than one
then the current per acre profits risk are greater (γ2σ2p < σ
2
c ). If it is equal to one
then the per acre profit risks are equal (γ2σ2p = σ
2
c ). Note that this result doesn’t
require any assumptions about the correlation between current and perennial per
acre returns.
Using this relationship and equation 4.6 we can show that when the compar-
ative static effect of land on perennial acres is less than one-half, the perennial
per acre profits risk is greater than the current per acre profit risk (γ2σ2p > σ
2
c ⇔
∂L˜p
∂L¯
> 1
2
). The intuition behind this results from recognizing that the land com-
parative static effect is equal to the fraction of land planted to perennials when
evaluated at zero relative profit (∂L˜p
∂L¯
= L˜p(pip−pic+b+τ=0)
∂L¯
). The landowner is decid-
ing how to allocate his/her land between two risky crops. If risk and returns are
the same for both crops then producing equal areas minimizes the aggregate risk.
If the returns are the same for two crops and the risks are greater for one crop
the landowner will allocate less land to the risker crop.
4.3 Empirical Methods
Our conceptual model above outlined the certainty equivalent utility function
(4.1) for crop choice under risk. When solved for the optimal perennial acreage,
the certainty equivalent utility function gives us a set of analytical solutions and
comparative static effects. The observable variables were collected using a survey,
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which included stated choice questions with randomized relative returns to con-
ventional and perennial crops as treatments. In chapter 2 this data was analyzed
without assumptions regarding the structure of the utility function. Here we use
the same data but specify the structural relationship as outlined in the conceptual
model.
The farmer’s decision is two-fold: whether or not to produce perennial crops
and how much acreage to allocate for perennial production. Based on the con-
ceptual model the decision to produce or not depends on how many acres would
be planted if in fact, perennials are planted. This is because the acreage decision
effects the expected profit and the risk. However, the acreage decision is only
observed for the farmers who choose to produce. First, we outline the economet-
rics needed to estimate the two decisions independently. Once we have a clear
understanding of these two decisions, we can outline techniques to deal with the
inter-dependency and the unobserved data.
4.3.1 Willingness to Supply
The willingness to supply (WTS) questions in the survey were designed as closed-
ended pure dichotomous choice questions. This minimizes bias by avoiding leading
the respondent. Dichotomous choice questions necessitate the use of a discrete
choice statistical analysis (e.g., probit, logit). Using a random utility model frame-
work, one can derive the probability the respondent will answer yes to the question
given assumptions about the underlying utility function and the distribution of
the error term (Wooldridge, 2002). Let U be the utility for the respondent:
(4.7)U(p˜ip − p˜ic, Lp, L¯,K, b)
where the variables are defined as they are in equation (4.1). The WTS questions
ask respondents if they would grow perennial crops given a randomized net return
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relative to their current crop choices. The respondent will answer “yes” to the
question if
(4.8)U(A = 1) > U(A = 0),
where the left hand side of the inequality (4.8) is the utility from producing
perennials and the right hand side is the utility from producing no perennials.
Using the certainty equivalent utility, equation 4.1 and equation (4.8), we have
the conditions under which adoption occurs,
(4.9)
V = V 1 − V 0
= (pip − pic + τ)Lp + bLp −K
− φ
2
(
L2pγ
2σ2p + (L
2
p − 2L¯Lp)σ2c + 2Lp
(
L¯− Lp
)
ργσpσc
)
> 0,
which is the certainty equivalent of the utility of adoption (V 1(A = 1)) minus
the certainty equivalent of utility of not adopting (V 0(A = 0)). The utility is
unobservable but the dichotomous choice, relative returns per acre, and the avail-
able land is observable. The adoption decision, as outlined in equation (4.1), is
dependent on the optimal interior perennial acreage. The perennial acreage is
only observable for respondents answering “yes” to the WTS question. Based on
our conceptual model, the respondents answering “no” to the WTS question must
have had a perennial acreage in mind when they made the decision to produce
or not. This is because the perennial acreage effects the risk adjusted profit. An
estimate of the perennial acreage can be determined from the observable assum-
ing the optimal perennial acreage solution. Therefore we substitute the optimal
perennial acreage given adoption into equation (4.9). The probability model is
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then,
(4.10)
Pr
[
(pip − pic + b+ τ)2
2φ(γ2σ2p + σ
2
c − 2ργσpσc)
+
(pip − pic + b+ τ)(σ2c − ρσcγσp)
(γ2σ2p + σ
2
c − 2ργσpσc)
L¯
+
φ(σ2c − ρσcγσp)2
2(σ2p + σ
2
c − 2ργσpσc)
L¯2 −K > A
]
where A = 1 − 0 is the error in the estimates of the risk adjusted profit which
is something that we don’t observe. In order to simplify this equation we define
β1 = φ
−1(γ2σ2p +σ
2
c − 2ργσpσc)−1 and β2 = (σ2c −ρσcγσp)(γ2σ2p +σ2c − 2ργσpσc)−1.
Substituting this into the previous equation we have
(4.11)Pr
[
β1
2
(pip − pic + b)2 + β2(pip − pic + b)L¯+ β
2
2
2β1
L¯2 −K > A
]
.
Using this probability model and reducing the unobservables to a single co-
efficient on the observables and noting that the probability model is normalized
to the standard normal for a probit estimation, we can determine the estimation
equation,
(4.12)Φ
(
α1(pip − pic) + α2L¯+ α3L¯(pip − pic) + α4(pip − pic)2 + α5L¯2 + α6
)
where α1 = bβ1/σ, α2 = bβ2/σ, α3 = β2/σ, α4 = β1/(2σ), α5 = β
2
2/(2β1σ), and
α6 = −Kσ−1+b2β1/(2σ). This is the reduced form equation were the independent
variables are the relative net return, available land, squares and interactions. The
normalization parameter prevents an estimation of the β parameters.
4.3.2 Perennial Acreage
If the respondents answer yes to the willingness to supply question, they are asked
a follow up question on the acreage they would use for perennial crop production
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given the relative expected net incomes per acre. The linear estimation model of
the perennial acreage using the certainty equivalent model is,
Lp = β1(pip − pic) + β2L¯+ β3 + L (4.13)
where β3 = b/β1. This equation which can be estimated by ordinary least squares
(OLS) regression for the observations in which the acreage is positive, assuming
that L ∼ N (0, σL). Equation 4.13 directly estimates the β parameters and the
estimate of b can be obtain by β3/β1. This linear equation is only a consistent
estimator of the coefficients if
(4.14)E
[
β1(pip − pic) + β2L¯+ β3 + L
∣∣∣A = 1]
= E
[
β1(pip − pic) + β2L¯+ β3 + L
]
.
The acreage decision is observed if A = 1, thus the subsample will include only
observations for which Lp ≥
√
2Kβ1. Those farmers that perceive a high risk of
perennials would allocate a lower fraction of land making it less likely that they
would adopt. Substituting for Lp, this becomes L ≥
√
2Kβ1−E[Lp], which shows
that µ is bound from below. Given that L is normally distributed, E[L|A = 1] >
E[L] = 0 therefore
E
[
β1(pip − pic) + β2L¯+ β3 + L |A = 1
]
= β1(pip − pic) + β2L¯+ β3 + E[L|A = 1].
(4.15)
where E[L|A = 1] is the source of the sample selection bias.
Self Selected Sample
The coefficients of the acreage decision can be consistently estimated by the se-
lected sample, of respondents that indicated perennial crop adoption, if the ex-
pectations of the selected sample equal that of the random sample. If this is not
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the case, as we have shown, the estimates are biased. The Heckman correction
model is commonly used to account for this bias (Heckman, 1979). The perennial
acreage is only observed if Lp ≥
√
2Kβ1. The simultaneous Heckman correction
is a system of equations
(4.16a)1{V > 0} = V (α) + A
(4.16b)Lp = β1(pip − pic) + β2L¯+ β3 + L.
where = V (α) is the reduced form of equation 4.12. We assume a bivariate normal
 = (A, L) ∼ N (0,Σ) with the following variance co-variance matrix
(4.17)Σ =
 1 σA,L
σA,L σL

where σA,L is the covariance of A and L. Using ρA,L =
σA,L
σAσL
the log likelihood
function2 is,
(4.18)
ln Φ [V (α)][Lp∈∅] +
ln Φ
V (α) + ρA,L Lp−β1(pip−pic)−β2L¯−β1bσL√
1− ρ2A,L

+ lnφ
(
Lp − β1(pip − pic)− β2L¯− β1b
σL
)
− σL
Lp /∈∅
where Φ (φ) is the standard normal cumulative distribution (probability density)
function (Wooldridge, 2002).
4.3.3 Joint Estimation Model
Using the Heckman approach we can get consistent and unbiased estimates of
β1, β2, and b. Using these estimates and our linear equation we could predict  Lp
2In practice we estimate tanh−1 ρA,L to restrict ρA,L to be between minus one and one and
lnσL to restrict σL to positive values
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and then estimate the discrete choice equations (i.e. two-step approach) giving
us predictions of risk adjusted profit variance σ and the fixed costs (K). Jointly
estimating this structural model in a single step will increase the efficiency of the
estimator. The system of equations that we are estimating is
(4.19a)
Pr[A = 1] = Φ
(
β2b(pip − pic) + β2bL¯+ β2L¯(pip − pic)
σA
+
β1/2(pip − pic)2 + β22/(2β1)L¯2 + b2β1/2 +K
σA
)
(4.19b)Lp = β1(pip − pic) + β2L¯+ β1b.
The log likelihood function is
(4.20)
ln Φ [−V (β)][A=0] + ln Φ [V (β)][A=1,Lp∈∅]
+
ln Φ
V (β) + ρA,L Lp−β1(pip−pic)−β2L¯−β1bσL√
1− ρ2A,L

+ lnφ
(
Lp − β1(pip − pic)− β2L¯− β1b
σL
)
− σL
[A=1],Lp /∈∅
where ln Φ [V (β)][A=1,Lp∈∅] is an additional modification to the log-likelihood func-
tion to include observations for which the respondent indicated that they would
produce perennials but did not indicate the number of acres for perennial produc-
tion.
4.4 Data
Table 4.1 summarizes the data used for the analysis. On average, landowners
owned or rented 318 acres. About one-quarter (24 percent) rented land. The crop
choice approach randomly assigned per acre net returns for grasses and woody
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Table 4.1: Summary Statistics
Variable Description Mean St. Dev. N
Land Land owned plus land rented 318 393 435
Grass Returns Perennial grass returns per acre
relative to current returns per acre
76.9 112 435
woody crop Returns Woody crop returns per acre rela-
tive to current returns per acre
129 113 435
Grass Yes Willing to grow perennial grasses
at relative net returns (0,1)
0.59 433
woody crop Yes Willing to grow woody crops at rel-
ative net returns (0,1)
0.44 432
Grass Acres Number of acres the landowner is
willing to grow perennial grasses
on.
80.2 99.2 228
woody crop Acres Number of acres the landowner is
willing to grow woody crops on.
49.1 53.1 170
crops relative to their current per acre net returns. The treatments ranged from
-$100 to $250 for grass and -$50 to $300 for woody crops at $50 increments.
The average grass and woody crop relative returns for surveys received was not
significantly different from what we would expect based on a balanced sample
($75 and $125).
4.5 Results
4.5.1 Reduced Form Models
Table 4.2 compares the reduced form models based on equation 4.18. Model one
restricts the error correlation (ρ) to zero (i.e., no simultaneous Heckman correc-
tion) and model two includes the error correlation. We estimate these two models
for both grasses and woody crops.
For both grasses and woody crops, the relative per acre returns and its square
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are significant predictors of perennial bioenergy crop adoption. Adoption is in-
creasing in per acre relative perennial returns. The rate of increase is declining
with higher relative net incomes. For both grasses and woody crops, adoption is
no longer increasing above $400 per acre. The effect of relative net incomes is
not significantly different from zero for relative net incomes above approximately
$270.
The marginal effect of the relative net income amount, for the acres equation,
is 0.19 and 0.12 for grasses and woody crops respectively. Since this is constant,
the change in acreage is 19 and 12 acres for each $100 change in relative net income
for grasses and woody crops respectively. A farmer with an additional 100 acres of
available land will produce 7.8 (0.96) more acres of grasses (woody crops). Using
this estimate and the constant coefficient, we can estimate the fraction of land at
zero relative net income for the mean available acres. The fraction of available
land for producing grasses (woody crops) is 18% (9%).
The second model uses the simultaneous Heckman procedure to correct the
bias of the estimation of the acreage equation. The correlation of the errors is not
significantly different from zero for either grasses or woody crops.
4.5.2 Structural Model
Tables 4.3 and 4.4 illustrate the parameter estimates from the structural model
(see equation 4.20). Model 3 assumes the ρ and b are equal to zero and Model
4 assumes that ρ is equal to zero. Model 5 is the unrestricted model. We esti-
mate the beta parameters, the non-pecuniary benefits, fixed capital costs, and the
variance of the risk adjusted profit. Using 1/β2−1 = (σ2p−σcp)(σ2c−σcp)−1, we es-
timate the ratio of the variance in the perennial returns minus the covariance over
the variance of current returns minus the covariance. Assuming the correlation
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Table 4.2: Reduced Form Coefficients With and Without Heckman Sample selec-
tion Correction
Grasses woody crops
(1) (2) (1) (2)
Yes
Land† 0.078* 0.082* −0.067 −0.070
(0.040) (0.042) (0.049) (0.052)
Returns† 0.80*** 0.80*** 0.68*** 0.68**
(0.13) (0.13) (0.15) (0.15)
Land*Returns† 0.0078 0.0090 0.023 0.023
(0.018) (0.018) (0.021) (0.021)
Land2† −0.0029 −0.0031 0.0034 0.0036
(0.0018) (0.0019) (0.0032) (0.0034)
Returns2† −0.20*** −0.20*** −0.167** −0.167**
(0.060) (0.060) (0.054) (0.054)
Constant −0.20 −0.21* −0.53*** −0.52***
(0.12) (0.13) (0.15) (0.15)
Acres
Returns 0.19* 0.18* 0.116** 0.118**
(0.080) (0.082) (0.040) (0.040)
Land 0.078* 0.077* 0.0096 0.0098
(0.030) (0.030) (0.0069) (0.0069)
Constant 31.0* 33.5* 27.0*** 25.7***
(13.3) (14.1) (4.9) (5.6)
σ 63 *** 63 *** 36.2*** 36.2***
(13) (13.0) (4.5) (4.5)
ρ −0.045 0.030
(0.041) (0.033)
log likelihood −2559.708 −2559.630 −1818.300 −1818.258
N 430 430 430 430
Robust standard errors and are in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
† The land and return variables were rescaled for the discrete choice equation to more easily
report the results. To obtain the unscaled coefficients and standard errors for land and
returns divide by 100. To obtain the unscaled coefficients and standard errors for the
interaction and the squared terms divide by 10,000. The returns and land where not rescaled
for the acres equation.
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is zero, this ratio is the ratio of the variances, σ2p/σ
2
c . For grasses, the ratio is 36
and significantly different from one (equal variance) at the 90% significance level.
For woody crops, the value is 99 but not significantly different from one. These
results are partly driven by the relatively low risk of corn and soybean production
due to crop insurance, future markets, and risk management strategies. In con-
trast perennial bioenergy crops lack well established markets, rely on government
programs, and do not have the same risk reduction options as corn and soybean.
Therefore, landowners’ subjective risk of perennial bioenergy production would
be much higher than risks for their current crops.
In addition to the parameters that can be estimated from the reduced form
models, we can estimate three additional parameters with the structural model.
Our estimation of the parameters for the structural models are in table 4.3 and
4.4. The structural model allows for an estimation of the fixed capital cost of
adoption, which is $11,000 for grasses and $14,000 for woody crops. We also
estimate the standard deviation of the error of the risk adjusted profit, which is
$18,000 for grasses and $16,000 for woody crops. For both grasses and woody
crops these non-pecuniary benefits are significantly different from zero for the
structural model.
4.6 Conclusion
This research uses a structural model and stated crop choice approach to ex-
amine perennial bioenergy production. Since markets do not currently exist, we
randomly assign relative returns to agricultural landowners. Using their stated
preferences and a structural model we estimate three determinants of crop choice
(risk, non-pecuniary benefits, and capital investment costs).
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Table 4.3: Structural Parameter Estimates for Perennial Grasses with and without
Heckman Sample Selection Correction
Model
Heckman Correction No No Yes
Parameter (3) (4) (5)
1
φ(σ2p+σ
2
c−2ρσpσc)
0.39*** 0.22** 0.19**
(0.053) (0.077) (0.073)
σ2c−ρσcσp
σ2p+σ
2
c−2ρσpσc
0.076*** 0.034* 0.027*
(0.018) (0.019) (0.016)
b 199.5* 268.9*
(109.1) (132.6)
K −1459.0 −9033.1* −11776.4**
(2177.8) (3688.8) (4444.7)
σL 65 *** 67 *** 67 ***
(12) (13) (13)
σA 22297* 17160*** 18000***
(11421) (4440) (4650)
ρ −0.120*
(0.051)
log likelihood −2604.523 −2584.929 −2584.411
N 430 430 430
Significance levels : ∗ 0.10 ∗∗ 0.01 ∗∗∗ 0.001
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Table 4.4: Structural Parameter Estimates for Woody Crops with and without
Heckman Sample Selection Correction
Model
Heckman Correction No No Yes
Parameter (3) (4) (5)
1
φ(σ2p+σ
2
c−2ρσpσc)
0.22*** 0.10** 0.10**
(0.027) (0.032) (0.032)
σ2c−ρσcσp
σ2p+σ
2
c−2ρσpσc
0.020*** 0.010* 0.0099*
(0.0060) (0.0039) (0.0039)
b 278.8* 290.2*
(122.7) (125.6)
K −6447.1*** −13257.0*** −13676.9***
(1219.0) (2946.6) (3013.4)
σL 36.2*** 36.2*** 36.2***
(4.5) (4.5) (4.5)
σA 16122*** 16288***
(3177) (3150)
ρ −0.019
(0.013)
log likelihood −1818.258 −1825.603 −1825.583
N 430 430 430
Significance levels : ∗ 0.10 ∗∗ 0.01 ∗∗∗ 0.001
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The findings show that agricultural landowners would be willing to diversify
production with perennial bioenergy crops if financially competitive but only on a
portion of their land. Estimation of the structural model shows that agricultural
landowners perceive a significantly higher risk to perennial bioenergy production
than their current crops. However, even with high capital investment costs, agri-
cultural landowners would be willing to produce perennial bioenergy crops as a
result of non-pecuniary benefits.
These results have implications for perennial bioenergy supply. Many perennial
bioenergy supply models use a simplifying assumption that farmers are risk neutral
(i.e., they grow only the crop with the higher returns) or that returns are risk free.
Results from our research suggest that if perennial bioenergy crops are financially
competitive, farmers will grow both crops. Farmers will only grow perennial
bioenergy crops on a small portion of their land due to the subjective risks of
perennial bioenergy production. Therefore, the perennial bioenergy supply models
which assume risk neutrality or risk free returns over-estimate perennial bioenergy
supply. In addition, many bioenergy production plant models assume high rates
of conversion within the supply shed. Our results suggest that conversion rates
will be low and therefore the supply shed will need to be larger. A larger search
radius will increase the transportation costs.
The results also have implications for the impact of policies to promote peren-
nial bioenergy crops. The subjective risks for perennial bioenergy crops are an
order of magnitude greater than the landowners current risks. Therefore, policies
that only address the expected returns without reducing the risk will have min-
imal impact at the intensive margins. Bioenergy policies must address the risks
associated with perennial bioenergy in addition to the returns to have a significant
impact on production. Policies that reduce risk may only need to be temporary
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until private insurance, contracts, futures markets and risk management strategies
are developed.
Finally, this research presents a methodology for modeling choice under risk
when the agent has a discrete and continuous choice to make. By applying a
structural model we are able obtain a richer understanding of the determinants of
those choices. This methodology can be applied to many fields.
Chapter 5
Discussion
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Perennial bioenergy crops provide an opportunity to produce renewable liquid
fuels in a more sustainable way than current feedstock production methods (i.e.,
corn ethanol, soy biodiesel, or cellulosic ethanol from crop residue). However,
farmers and landowners are largely unfamiliar with perennial bioenergy crop pro-
duction. In addition, emerging markets that depend on subsidies can be highly
volatile. The risks involved in producing a novel crop and the uncertainty in
how to manage that risk will affect the willingness of farmers and landowners to
produce perennial bioenergy crops at the intensive and extensive margins. The
goal of this dissertation is to better understand the potential supply of perennial
bioenergy crops and the role that risk, uncertainty, and policy levers play in crop
choice decisions of farmers and landowners.
Using a stated crop choice approach (see chapter 2), we examined the will-
ingness of agricultural landowners to produce perennial bioenergy crops at the
intensive and extensive margins given expectations about relative net returns per
acre. We found that a majority of landowners would be willing to produce peren-
nial bioenergy crops if financially competitive. However, they are only willing to
produce these crops on a small portion of their land. The portion of landowners
and acreage is increasing in relative net returns. Given the same net returns for
grasses (e.g., switchgrass) and short rotation woody crops (SRWC), landowners
prefer grasses and are willing to produce more acreage. In addition, non-farming
landowners, although less willing than farmers, would produce perennial bioenergy
crops on more acres.
One possible explanation for the high level of interest in perennial bioenergy
crops, but the low production levels, is due to the risk and uncertainty in growing
a crop that is largely unknown to the farmer. Using the state-contingent approach,
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we characterize the comparative static effects of different policies levers on peren-
nial bioenergy acres (see chapter 3). These policy levers are similar to the payment
options in the Biomass Crop Assistance Program. There are two taxonomies of
effects: substitution and indirect. The substitution effect is non-negative for all
three policies. Landowners and farmers prefer higher returns. The indirect effect
due to changes in uncertainty and preferences can be positive or negative. The
indirect effect and the comparative static effect is positive when the landowner or
farmer prefers this change in uncertainty and preferences. Otherwise the indirect
effect is negative and the comparative static effect is ambiguous. In some cases the
substitution from conventional to perennial bioenergy crops will be muted by the
indirect effect and, for some farmers, the policy could decrease perennial acreage.
Given the ambiguity of the impact of policies to promote perennial bioenergy
on production at the intensive margins and the importance of the relative magni-
tude of the risks we use a structural model to estimate the relative risks and fixed
costs of adoption (see chapter 4). We find that the landowners’ perception of the
net return risks were an order of magnitude greater for grasses when compared
to their current crops. For SRWC, the perception of risk was two orders of mag-
nitude greater. We also found significantly lower fixed adoption costs for grasses
than for trees.
In this research, we have shown that risk and uncertainty can be an important
driver in decisions regarding perennial bioenergy crop production. Bioenergy po-
lices need to consider the role that risk and uncertainty can have in determining
the successful promotion of perennial bioenergy crops. Given the perception of
higher risks of perennial bioenergy production, policies can increase their effec-
tiveness by reducing risk or promoting perennial bioenergy crop insurance.
More research is necessary to understand the heterogeneity of risks and fixed
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costs in perennial crop production. Farmers perceptions, attitudes, and barriers
can have non-pecuniary impacts on willingness to produce and acreages. Finally,
incorporation of risk aversion into partial and general equilibrium models, even
in a very simplistic way, can increase the reliability of these models to predict
bioenergy feedstock supply.
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Appendix A
Nonresponse
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A.1 Comparative Analysis
Using the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) census data, we can
compare the responses to questions in our survey to the general population in the
nine county area. The challenge in comparing the census data with our respon-
dents is that the census data is of farms and our population is farmland owners.
There is significant overlap between farmers and farmland owners. We estimate
that just over half (56%) of the farmland owners are farmers.
One direct comparison that we can make is between land use as indicated
by our farmland owner respondents and the planted acres within the nine county
area. The census is taken once every five years and was not taken the year that we
conducted the survey. The question in our survey asked for the average acreages
per year to account for rotating. Table A.1 summarizes the proportion of cropland
acres the respondents own that is being used for a particular crop and the portion
of the planted acres from the 2007 and 2012 USDA census. Our survey appears
to over-sample farmland owners that have a higher proportion of soybean acres
and under-sample farmland owners that have a higher proportion of hay acres.
This result is the opposite of what we would have expected given that hay is a
perennial crop and has a similar production system to grass bioenergy crops.
A.2 Response Round
The survey methodology included multiple contacts with the farmland owners.
This included two mailings of the questionnaire along with postcard followups.
The second round of questionnaires was mailed only to the farmland owners that
92
Table A.1: Share of Cropland
Census Survey 2009
2007 2012 Est. SE
Corn 53.9 54.6 52.7 3.7
Soybeans 35.5 36.2 42.2 2.7
Alfalfa 1.8 1.5 2.0 0.2
Vegetables 0.9 0.3
Small Grains 1.5 1.0 0.8 0.1
Hay 7.3 6.6 0.7 0.1
SugarBeets 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.1
Table A.2: Difference in Response Between Rounds (Round 2 - Round 1)
Yes/No Acres
Grasses Trees Trees Grasses
Amt ∆ SE ∆ SE ∆ SE ∆ SE
-$100 -0.09 0.11 -14 13
-$50 -0.06 0.12 -0.04 0.06 -5 -30 23
$0 0.13 0.07 0.02 0.18 -1 15 -30 29
$50 -0.03 0.14 0.00 0.15 1 15 21 23
$100 -0.06 0.12 0.12 0.14 33 17 3 18
$150 0.00 0.15 0.00 0.14 7 15 29 27
$200 0.12 0.11 0.01 0.14 56 27 -3 29
$250 -0.11 0.11 0.00 0.14 -22 27 76 71
$300 0.17 0.14 37 28
-0.02 0.05 0.01 0.05 14 9 16 13
Significance levels : ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 1% ∗∗∗ : 0.1%
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had not responded and was slightly modified1 to allow collection of data on the sur-
vey round. The second round respondents are non-respondents to the first round
and can give us an indication of how the non-respondents differ from the respon-
dents (Lindner, Murphy, and Briers, 2001). These second round respondents may
still be interested in perennial bioenergy crops but did not respond because of
common non-response reasons. Following up with nonrespondents, Paulrud and
Laitila (2010) found that 83% of the nonrespondents indicated a lack of time to
answer the questionnaire or a lack of interest in answering surveys. In our survey
37% of the responses were to the second round of surveys. Table A.2 summarizes
the difference in the means from the second round to the first round. There is
no significant difference between the percentage of respondents that would grow
grasses or trees or the acres of grasses or trees between the two rounds.2
A.3 Interest
As part of the survey we asked respondents to rate their current level of interest in
perennial bioenergy crops given that they were financially competitive using a Lik-
ert scale3 This question was asked the page before the questions with the treatment
amounts. Respondents that had no interest in perennial bioenergy crops are likely
similar to farmland owners that did not respond to the questionnaire because of a
lack of interest in perennial bioenergy crops. Our pre-survey prediction was that
the respondents with no interest would not be willing to grow perennial bioenergy
crops. However, some of the respondents (22%) that had no interest were willing
1The first round of questionnaires had a color front page and the second round had the same
front page but in black and white
2Respondents that were non-respondents to the first round did not differ significantly from
the first round respondents.
3The Likert Scale had four response options: No, Little, Some, High.
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Table A.3: Difference in Response Between Interest and No Interest
Grasses Trees
Yes/No Acres Yes/No Acres
Amt ∆ SE ∆ SE ∆ SE ∆ SE
-$100 0.18 0.16
-$50 0.23 0.14 0.06 0.06
$0 0.51* 0.20 60 0.42* 0.14 20
$50 0.56** 0.21 -32 0.51*** 0.20
$100 0.56** 0.20 -15 0.57*** 0.21
$150 0.44* 0.18 43 0.42** 0.14 -3 26
$200 0.31 0.21 16 0.21 0.18 67 48
$250 0.29* 0.15 48 114 0.35* 0.14 -68* 30
$300 0.46** 0.15 17 46
0.41*** 0.07 18 0.38*** 0.05 -11 16
Significance levels : ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 1% ∗∗∗ : 0.1%
to grow perennial bioenergy crops when given the relative net income treatments.
Table A.3 summarizes the difference in means for the respondents with at least
some interest and no interest. This difference is statistically significant at the
0.001 level for the percentage of respondents willing to grow grasses and trees.
The significance and magnitude is consistently positive with an inconsistent mag-
nitude across the relative net income amounts. The difference is the largest and
most significant at the relative net income amounts that are positive but closer to
zero for both grasses and trees. When the relative net income amounts are neg-
ative, the difference is not significant because of the low percentage of interested
farmland owners willing to grow perennial bioenergy crops. When the relative net
income amounts increase above $100, the difference declines because respondents
not interested in perennial bioenergy crops are more willing to grow them with
higher relative returns. This suggest that with high enough net returns interest
doesn’t matter. Estimates of the percentage of farmland owners willing to grow
95
perennial bioenergy crops from our sample will be higher than a random sample of
our population. The level of bias can be estimated by applying the willingness to
grow percentage for those with no interest to an estimate of non-respondents with
no interest and our estimate of willingness to grow percentage for respondents to
the rest of the sample. We use the estimate of no interest in perennial bioenergy
crops for the non-respondents from the Paulrud and Laitila (2010) study (13%).
This gives us an estimated bias of 2.7%. The difference between interest and no
interest is not significant for the acres of grasses and trees.
By using the difference in means for the response round and interest as proxies
for the reasons that people choose not to respond to bioenergy surveys, we are able
to show that the non-response bias is limited to the willingness to grow estimates.
That is, we see no difference in grass or tree acres between response rounds and
interest. Other studies that have conducted a follow up to determine the reason
for nonresponse find that most of the nonrespondents don’t have time or don’t
like to answer questionnaires. Non-respondents that have no interest in perennial
bioenergy crops will bias our estimate of willingness to grow upwards. The bias
will depend on the the interest levels in the population and the relative net income
amounts. Higher interest and relative net income amounts further from zero will
lead to lower bias.
Appendix B
Coefficients of the Unrestricted
Model
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B.1 Coefficients of Unrestricted Model
The following table provides the coefficients of the model. The results section
presented the marginal effects.
Table B.1: Conditional Mixed-Process Multivariate Regression
Grasses Trees
Variable Yes Acres Yes Acres
Treatments
Grass net income 0.60*** 8.8 -0.27* 2.7
(0.11) (11) (0.11) (5.1)
Tree net income 0.0070 3.8 0.47*** 9.7*
(0.080) (5.4) (0.096) (4.3)
Interaction 0.050 -1.1 0.083 0.47
(0.083) (4.7) (0.069) (2.4)
Design
Round 2 0.053 -0.68 0.028 -14.6*
(0.17) (9.42) (0.16) (6.89)
County Yes Yes Yes Yes
Tenure
Area Owned 0.000050 0.27*** 0.00081 0.10*
(0.00070) (0.066) (0.00056) (0.040)
Area Rented -0.00044 0.28*** 0.0026*** 0.082*
(0.00081) (0.065) (0.00077) (0.035)
Area Farmed 0.00045 -0.22*** -0.0017** -0.086**
(0.00070) (0.056) (0.00062) (0.031)
Landuse
SRWC area 0.087 5.60 0.23** 11.7***
(0.11) (4.47) (0.086) (2.51)
Hay area -0.0089 -1.20* -0.019 0.18
(0.013) (0.62) (0.013) (0.71)
Alfalfa area -0.0049 -0.098 -0.0026 -0.043
(0.0059) (0.36) (0.0049) (0.25)
Pasture area 0.00060 0.096 -0.0049 0.46**
Continued on next page
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(0.0056) (0.23) (0.0039) (0.15)
Orchards area -0.0098 7.57* 0.089 0.28
(0.088) (4.08) (0.088) (2.89)
Wetland area 0.00030 1.97** 0.015** -0.13
(0.0068) (0.66) (0.0054) (0.21)
CRP area 0.027 -1.10*** 0.00075 -0.10
(0.021) (0.26) (0.0049) (0.19)
Woods area 0.0018 -1.30** -0.0036 -0.046
(0.0051) (0.48) (0.0049) (0.30)
Recreation area -0.0020 -0.62* 0.019* -0.085
(0.0056) (0.29) (0.0080) (0.20)
Native Prairie area 0.0030 0.42 0.0049 0.11
(0.0066) (0.39) (0.0056) (0.36)
Wildlife area 0.0010 -0.57* -0.0064 -0.090
(0.0039) (0.24) (0.0058) (0.24)
Conservation
CRP 0.11 -15.1 -0.20 0.18
(0.21) (17.2) (0.21) (9.34)
CSP -0.078 -9.54 0.61* -22.9*
(0.24) (15.9) (0.26) (10.2)
Soil Conservation 0.10 11.5 -0.29* -8.71
(0.19) (9.55) (0.17) (8.34)
Demographics
Gender
Female 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(.) (.) (.) (.)
Male 0.516* -16.230 0.712** -22.532*
(0.246) (12.830) (0.233) (12.560)
Age -0.0019 -0.057 -0.012* -0.36
(0.0067) (0.42) (0.0056) (0.29)
Work off Farm
No 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(.) (.) (.) (.)
Yes -0.21 5.82 0.089 -12.4*
(0.20) (12.3) (0.18) (7.41)
Continued on next page
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Education
Some high school 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(.) (.) (.) (.)
High School -0.059 -10.9 0.053 28.7*
(0.35) (20.0) (0.40) (14.5)
Some College -0.22 8.77 0.30 27.1
(0.39) (18.8) (0.43) (19.6)
2 year degree 0.25 -9.73 -0.016 26.2*
(0.36) (24.1) (0.42) (14.6)
Bachelor’s -0.11 -2.36 0.19 12.4
(0.39) (24.0) (0.43) (15.3)
Graduate 0.20 -18.0 -0.045 10.4
(0.41) (24.1) (0.45) (16.1)
No answer 0.47 20.8 -0.45 39.0
(0.91) (71.1) (0.82) (27.3)
Household Income
less than $25,000 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(.) (.) (.) (.)
$25,000-50,000 0.42 -12.5 -0.13 7.09
(0.37) (18.8) (0.38) (12.8)
$50,000-75,000 0.62 -24.2 -0.21 20.1
(0.38) (24.3) (0.39) (15.4)
$75,000-100,000 1.00** -20.2 0.24 4.27
(0.39) (29.2) (0.41) (14.5)
$100,000-150,000 0.99* -8.73 -0.0019 26.5
(0.40) (32.2) (0.42) (18.6)
more than $150,000 0.77* 23.5 0.32 26.2*
(0.46) (24.0) (0.43) (15.2)
No answer 0.54 -8.74 -0.25 -23.6
(0.49) (31.8) (0.47) (19.2)
Farm Income
Net Loss 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(.) (.) (.) (.)
$0-5,000 0.074 36.6 0.021 40.9*
(0.47) (27.8) (0.40) (18.0)
Continued on next page
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$5,000-10,000 0.41 41.4 -0.076 62.2***
(0.53) (27.7) (0.38) (18.1)
$10,000-25,000 -0.035 61.4* 0.050 49.9**
(0.45) (30.6) (0.36) (16.1)
$25,000-50,000 -0.20 67.7* 0.51 75.6***
(0.44) (32.1) (0.37) (19.3)
more than $50,000 0.021 57.1 0.40 50.4**
(0.47) (38.5) (0.41) (16.3)
No answer -0.26 49.4 0.10 54.6*
(0.52) (42.9) (0.47) (26.6)
Interest Grass
No 0.00 0.00
(.) (.)
Little 0.20 -0.77*
(0.37) (0.37)
Some 1.17** 0.23
(0.37) (0.32)
High 1.84** 0.52
(0.63) (0.40)
No answer 0.32 -0.21
(0.39) (0.37)
Interest Tree
No 0.00 0.00
(.) (.)
Little 0.58* 1.09***
(0.27) (0.27)
Some 0.47* 1.29***
(0.23) (0.26)
High 0.43 2.27***
(0.73) (0.34)
No answer 1.02* 0.99*
(0.42) (0.43)
Constant -2.24* 41.7 -1.11 2.90
(0.91) (91.7) (0.76) (30.2)
N 419
Continued on next page
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Grasses Trees
Variable Yes Acres Yes Acres
Log pseudolikelihood -2381.31
Likelihood Ratio Test (Constant Model) χ2(222) 784.16
Appendix C
Survey
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Minnesota)Agricultural)Landowner)Survey)of)Energy)Crops)
!
!
Dear!Landowner,!
!
The!United!States!has!set!goals!to!significantly!increase!the!amount!of!electricity,!thermal!energy,!and!
biofuels!made!from!renewable!sources.!One!important!source!is!perennial!plants!grown!on!farmland.!
The!Center!for!Integrated!Natural!Resources!and!Agriculture!at!the!University!of!Minnesota!is!
collecting!information!from!farm!landowners!regarding!their!attitudes!and!opinions!towards!perennial!
energy!crops.!!
!
You!do!not!need!to!have!any!expertise!in!farming,!farm!
the! land! yourself! or! even! have! heard! of! perennial!
energy!crops!to!successfully!complete!this!survey.!!
!
The! survey! is! intended! for! the! owner! of! farmland! in!
Minnesota.!Your!individual!responses!will!be!completely!
confidential! and! anonymous.! No! individual! responses!
will! be! reported.! The! survey! will! take! between! 15J20!
minutes!to!complete.!
!
Please!return!the!questionnaire!in!the!enclosed,!selfJaddressed,!postageJpaid!envelope!within!10!days!
of!receipt.!Once!we!have!received!your!completed!questionnaire,!your!name!and!any!identifying!
information!will!be!deleted!from!our!database.!
Survey!#!130!
If!you!have!any!questions!or!concerns,!please!contact!me!at!(612)!624J4299!or!email!me!at!
curre002@umn.edu.!Thank!you!in!advance!for!participating!in!this!important!project.!
!
!
Sincerely,)
)
!
Dean!Current,!Ph.D.!
Project!Leader!
!
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Landowner)and)Land)Use)Profile____________________________________________________!
!
1.)What)is)the)total)acreage)of)farmland)your)household)owns,)leases,)and/or)farms)regardless)of)location)
or)use?!
) Total)Acres)
Land!I!Own! !
Land!I!Lease/sharecrop!TO!others! G)
Land!I!rent/sharecrop!FROM!others! +)
Total!Land!I!Farm!! =)
!
2.)How)long)have)you)or)your)immediate)family)owned)your)farmland?!
______________!Years!
!
3.!What)current)uses)are)made)of)the)farmland)that)you)OWN,)regardless)of)whether)or)not)you)farm)it?)!
Please!indicate!the!total!acreage.!If!you!rotate!crops!please!indicate!average!acreage!per!year.!
!
!!Acres! ! ! ! ! ! !!Acres!
_______!Corn! ! ! ! ! _______!Confined!livestock!
_______!Soybeans!! ! ! ! _______!Short!rotation!woody!crops!!!!!!!!!
_______!Wheat,!oats,!and!other!small!grains! _______!Orchards!
_______!Sugar!beets! ! ! ! _______!Native!prairie!
_______!Alfalfa! ! ! ! ! _______!Wetland!
_______!Hay—not!including!alfalfa! ! _______!Wildlife!habitat!
_______!Pasture!livestock!! ! ! _______!Recreation—such!as!hunting,!bird!watching!!
_______Vegetables! ! ! ! _______!Other___________________________________!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
)
4.!What!is)the)average)rental)rate)for)land)that)you)own?)If!you!don’t!rent!out!your!land!please!estimate!!!
!!!!!based!on!rental!rates!in!your!area.!
Cropland! ! $_____________!Acre/Year!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!___!Don’t!Know!
Pastureland! $_____________!Acre/Year!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!___!Don’t!Know!
!
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)
5.))Have)you)ever)implemented)any)of)the)following)programs)or)practices)on)your)land?!Please!circle!!
!!!!!the!number!corresponding!to!your!answer.!
!! Yes) No)
Don't)
Know)
Conservation!easement!such!as!Conservation!Reserve!Program!(CRP)! 1! 2! 9!
Government!conservation!program!that!conserves!natural!resources!while!
farming!such!as!the!Conservation!Security!Program!(CSP)!!
1! 2! 9!
Soil!conservation!practice!such!as!noJtill/lowJtill,!direct!seeding,!nutrient!
management!!
1! 2! 9!
)
6.)Everyone)has)different)plans)for)how)their)land)will)be)used)in)the)future.)How)likely)are)each)of)the)
following)situations)to)occur)within)the)next)ten)years?!Please!circle!the!number!that!fits!each!situation!
the!best.!!
!
Highly)
Unlikely)
Somewhat)
Unlikely)
Somewhat)
Likely)
Highly)
Likely)
Don't)
Know)
Land!will!be!operated!by!family!member(s)!! 1! 2! 3! 4! 9!
Land!will!be!inherited!by!family!member(s)! 1! 2! 3! 4! 9!
Land!will!be!sold!for!agricultural!use! 1! 2! 3! 4! 9!
Land!will!be!sold!for!a!nonJagricultural!use! 1! 2! 3! 4! 9!
Land!will!be!rented! 1! 2! 3! 4! 9!
Land!will!be!used!for!recreation! 1! 2! 3! 4! 9!
Land!will!be!taken!out!of!production!and!used!
for!conservation! 1! 2! 3! 4! 9!
I!will!diversify!the!current!use(s)!of!my!land! 1! 2! 3! 4! 9!
I!will!reduce!the!current!use(s)!of!my!land! 1! 2! 3! 4! 9!
I!will!maintain!the!current!use(s)!of!my!land! 1! 2! 3! 4! 9!
I!will!cease!to!use!my!land! 1! 2! 3! 4! 9!
I!will!grow!a!different!crop! 1! 2! 3! 4! 9!
!
7.)Which)of)the)following)best)describes)your)awareness)about)the)using)perennial)crops)grown)from)
farmland)for)energy)production)before)receiving)this)survey?!)
!
)
No)
Awareness)
Little)
Awareness)
Some)
Awareness)
High)
Awareness)
Perennial!Grasses! 1! 2! 3! 4!
Trees! 1! 2! 3! 4!
!
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)
)
Attitudes)and)Perceptions_______________________________________________________)
8.)Please)indicate)the)extent)to)which)you)agree)or)disagree)with)the)following)statements.)Circle!the!
number!that!corresponds!with!your!opinion.!!)
!!
Strongly)
Disagree)
Somewhat)
Disagree)
Somewhat)
Agree)
Strongly)
Agree)
Don't)
Know)
I!am!concerned!with!the!quality!of!my!farm!soil! 1! 2! 3! 4! 9!
I!am!concerned!with!the!effect!my!land!has!on!water!quality! 1! 2! 3! 4! 9!
I!believe!it!is!important!to!provide!habitat!for!wildlife!on!my!
land! 1! 2! 3! 4! 9!
Growing!perennial!energy!crops!could!improve!water!
quality!in!my!area! 1! 2! 3! 4! 9!
Growing!perennial!energy!crops!could!provide!wildlife!
habitat!on!my!land! 1! 2! 3! 4! 9!
Diversifying!my!production!will!reduce!financial!risk!on!my!
farm! 1! 2! 3! 4! 9!
If!I!were!to!grow!perennial!energy!crops!I!would!be!
perceived!as!a!land!steward!by!my!peers! 1! 2! 3! 4! 9!
The!United!States!should!increase!domestic!sources!of!
renewable!energy! 1! 2! 3! 4! 9!
Farmland!should!be!used!to!increase!the!United!States'!
energy!independence!! 1! 2! 3! 4! 9!
I!have!a!responsibility!to!conserve!the!land!for!use!by!future!
generations! 1! 2! 3! 4! 9!
)
Fast Facts about Perennial Grasses, Legumes and Forbs 
! High yielding, drought tolerant, and requires lower fertilizer and herbicide quantities 
compared to row crops 
! Once planted, needs to be re-planted only once every 10 years in early spring  
! No-till practices can be used 
! Harvested annually in late fall or early spring after nutrients have returned to the roots 
! Less time to manage throughout plant’s life cycle 
! Harvested using conventional haying equipment  
 
Fast Facts about Trees 
! Requires lower fertilizer and herbicide quantities compared to row crops 
! Harvested between 3 and 12 years after planting  
! Once established, can be harvested for 20-30 years without any root disturbance or 
replanting 
! Less time to manage throughout plant’s life cycle 
! Harvested using standard forestry equipment 
 
What are the Benefits of Perennial Energy Crops? 
! Adds organic matter to soils 
! Reduces erosion  
! Improves water quality 
! Provides wildlife habitat 
! Sequesters carbon from atmosphere 
106
5 
9.)Assuming)growing)perennial)crops)for)energy)production)was)financially)competitive)with)your)current)
use,)how)would)you)rate)your)current)level)of)interest?!
!!
) No)Interest)
Little)
Interest)
Some)
Interest)
High)
Interest)
Perennial!Grasses! 1! 2! 3! 4!
Trees! 1! 2! 3! 4!
)
)
10.)Below)is)a)list)of)potential)barriers)a)landowner)might)encounter)when)considering)growing))
perennial)crops,)both)grasses)and)trees.)To)what)degree)would)each)of)the)following)factors)limit)your)
willingness)to)grow)perennial)crops)for)energy?!Circle!the!number!that!corresponds!with!your!opinion.!
!!
Potential)Barrier)
Highly)
Limiting)
Moderately)
Limiting)
Slightly)
Limiting)
Not)
Limiting)
Don't)
Know)
A!lapse!in!income!until!first!harvest! 1! 2! 3! 4! 9!
Risk!of!unsuccessful!establishment! 1! 2! 3! 4! 9!
Lack!of!access!to!proper!equipment! 1! 2! 3! 4! 9!
Risk!involved!with!growing!a!new!crop! 1! 2! 3! 4! 9!
Cost!to!establish!! 1! 2! 3! 4! 9!
Lack!of!financial!assistance!! 1! 2! 3! 4! 9!
Lack!of!information!about!growing!crop! 1! 2! 3! 4! 9!
Lack!of!renter!or!contract!service!provider! 1! 2! 3! 4! 9!
Necessity!to!learn!new!skills!! 1! 2! 3! 4! 9!
Opinion!of!my!family!and!friends! 1! 2! 3! 4! 9!
Spending!time!to!learn!about!a!different!system! 1! 2! 3! 4! 9!
Having!to!sign!a!contract!with!the!government!! 1! 2! 3! 4! 9!
Having!to!sign!a!contract!with!an!energy!producer! 1! 2! 3! 4! 9!
Having!to!complete!paperwork!involved!with!
program! 1! 2! 3! 4! 9!
Loss!of!base!acreage!eligible!for!government!
subsidies! 1! 2! 3! 4! 9!
Loss!of!bank!loan!eligibility!for!converted!acres! 1! 2! 3! 4! 9!
Working!with!government!technical!assistance! 1! 2! 3! 4! 9!
Current!renter!not!interested! 1! 2! 3! 4! 9!
)
)
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)
11.)Below)is)a)list)of)potential)barriers)a)landowner)might)encounter)when)considering)growing))
)trees)specifically.)To)what)degree)would)each)of)the)following)factors)limit)your)willingness)to)))))
)grow)trees)for)energy?!Circle!the!number!that!corresponds!with!your!opinion!
Potential)Barrier)
Highly)
Limiting)
Moderately)
Limiting)
Slightly)
Limiting)
Not)
Limiting)
Don't)
Know)
Long!delay!till!first!harvest!(3J12!years)! 1! 2! 3! 4! 9!
Access!to!equipment!for!harvesting! 1! 2! 3! 4! 9!
Having!tree!roots!and!stumps!in!tillable!land! 1! 2! 3! 4! 9!
Long!term!commitment!for!the!land!(20J30!years)! 1! 2! 3! 4! 9!
!
12.)If)growing)perennial)energy)crops)was)financially)competitive)with)your)current)practice)and)there)was)
an)energy)buyer,)which)financial)arrangements)you)would)prefer,)assuming)annual)net)farm)income)is)
the)SAME)under)all)arrangements?!Rank!all!of!the!following!choices!1?5!with!1!being!your!top!choice!and!
5!being!your!bottom!choice.!Rank!perennial!grasses!and!trees!separately.!)
!
Perennial)
Grasses)
!
! Trees)
A.!Planting,!maintenance,!and!harvest!would!be!my!own!responsibility!and!I!!!!!!!!!!!!
would!be!paid!for!biomass!crop!upon!delivery.!! !!
!
! !!
B.)A)portion)of)the)cost)of)planting!would!be!covered;!I!would!receive!an!
annual)payment)for)the!first)5)years;!maintenance!and!harvest!would!be!
my!own!responsibility;!I!would!be!paid!for!biomass!crop!upon!delivery.) !!
!
! !!
C.)10)year)easement!for!which!I!would!receive!an!annual)payment;!planting,!
maintenance,!and!harvest!would!be!my!responsibility;!I!would!also!be!paid!
for!biomass!crop!upon!delivery.! !!
!
! !!
D.)10)year)easement!for!which!I!would!receive!an!annual)payment;!planting,!
maintenance,!and!harvest!would!be!the!responsibility!of!a!contract)service)
provider!that!I!hire;!I!would!be!paid!for!biomass!crop!upon!delivery.! !!
!
! !!
E.)10)year)or)longer)rental)agreement!with!contract!service!provider;!
establishment,!maintenance,!and!harvest!would!the!responsibility!of!
contract)service)provider;!I!would!be!paid!an!annual)rental)payment.! !!
!
! !!
)
13.)If)your)annual)net)farm)income)from)growing)perennial)grasses)was)$100)per)acre)LOWER)than)your)
current)annual)net)farm)income)per)acre)would)you)grow)perennial)grasses)on)at)least)some)of)your)
land?!Net!farm!income!is!total!farm!revenue!minus!all!farm!costs!and!expenses.)
!
!!Yes!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!How!many!acres!would!you!grow!at!this!net!farm!income?!______________acres!
!!No!
!
14.)If)your)annual)net)farm)income)from)growing)trees)was)the)SAME)per)acre))as)your)current)annual)net)
farm)income)per)acre)would)you)grow)trees)on)at)least)some)of)your)land?!Net!farm!income!is!total!farm!
revenue!minus!all!farm!costs!and!expenses.!
!
!!Yes!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!How!many!acres!would!you!grow!at!this!net!farm!income?!______________acres!
!!No!
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15.)If)the)particular)perennial)crop)you)were)considering)growing)was)known)to)be)a)noxious)or)invasive)
weed)(causes)or)is)likely)to)cause)environmental)harm))how)would)you)answer)question)13)and)14?!
!
Question!13JGrasses! ! ! ! Question!14JTrees! ! ! ! ! !
!!Yes!_________acres!!!!! ! ! !!Yes!_________acres!!!!!
!!No! ! ! ! ! ! !!No!
!
16.)If)you)were)to)grow)perennial)energy)crops)which)type)of)farmland)would)you)target)for)))
))))))establishment?!Please!check!all!that!apply.!
!
  Sandy!soils! ! ! ! ! !!Poor!quality!soil!
!!Poorly!drained!soils! ! ! ! !!Sloped!land!
!!Land!near!a!lake,!river!or!stream! ! !!Most!productive!land!
!!All!my!land!
!
!
Land)Tenure__________________________________________________________________)
!
17.)Which)of)the)following)best)describes)your)farming)operation?!Please!check!one!
!
!I!own!and!operate!my!own!land!(Please!skip!to!question!#!24)!
!I!have!a!one!year!lease!and!receive!cash!rent! ! !
!I!have!a!multiple!year!lease!and!receive!cash!rent!
!I!have!a!share!cropping!arrangement!
!Other_______________________________________!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!If!selected!please!answer!questions!!
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!18!through!23!
!
18.)How)long)have)you)had)your)current)renter/sharecropper?!
__________!years!
!
19.)Is)your)current)renter/sharecropper)an)immediate)or)extended)family)member?)
! !!Yes! ! !!No!!
!
20.)Are)conservation)practices)mentioned)in)your)lease)or)lease)supplement?)
!!Yes! ! !!No!(Please!skip!to!question!#!21)!
Please!check!all!below!that!apply.!
!!NoJtill! ! ! ! ! ! ! !!Precision!planting!
!!Specific!crop!rotation!! ! ! ! !!Planting!or!maintenance!of!buffers!
!!Perennial!crop! ! ! ! ! !!Cover!crop_______________!
!!Conservation!drainage! ! ! ! !!Pasture!management______________!
!!Conservation!Reserve!Program! ! ! !!Conservation!Stewardship!Program!!
!!Environmental!Quality!Incentives!Program! ! !!ReJInvest!in!Minnesota!
!!Other:!_____________________________!
)
 
 
 
 
 
B B 
 
 
B 
B 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
B 
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21.)Have)you)discussed)conservation)practices)with)your)current)renter?)
!!Yes! ! Who!initiated!the!discussion?!
! ! ! !
!!No!! ! What!is!keeping!you!from!initiating!this!conversation?!
!
!
)
)
22.)Would)you)like)to)incorporate)conservation)practices)into)your)lease)with)your)renter?)
!
!!Not!Interested! !!Little!Interest! !!Some!Interest!! !!High!Interest! !!N/A!
!
23.))People)have)different)approaches)when)making)decisions)about)their)land.)How)well)do)you)agree))
)))))))with)the)following)statements?!Please!circle!number!that!corresponds!with!your!opinion.!
!
!!
Highly)
Disagree)
Somewhat)
Disagree)
Somewhat)
Agree)
Highly)
Agree)
Don't)
Know)
The!renter!makes!most!of!the!decisions!about!the!
type!of!crops!grown! 1! 2! 3! 4! 9!
The!renter!makes!most!of!the!decisions!about!
tillage!practices! 1! 2! 3! 4! 9!
I!make!the!decisions!about!conservation!on!my!
land! 1! 2! 3! 4! 9!
My!renter!farms!the!land!the!way!I!want!it!to!be!
farmed! 1! 2! 3! 4! 9!
I!encourage!my!renter!to!utilize!soil!conserving!
practices! 1! 2! 3! 4! 9!
I!can!freely!discuss!the!use!of!different!practices!
with!my!renter! 1! 2! 3! 4! 9!
The!type!of!relationship!I!have!with!the!renter!
strongly!influences!decisions!made!about!the!farm! 1! 2! 3! 4! 9!
The!length!of!my!relationship!with!the!current!
renter!strongly!influences!decisions!made!about!
the!farm!
1! 2! 3! 4! 9!
My!renter’s!opinion!significantly!influences!
decision!made!about!the!farm! 1! 2! 3! 4! 9!
)
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Landowner)Information________________________________________________________!
!
24.)Are)you)a))
!!Male! ! !!Female!
!
25.)Your)age)
________years!old!
!
27.)Does)anyone)in)your)household)work)offGtheGfarm?)
!!Yes! ! ! !!No!
!
26.)Which)of)the)following)best)describes)your)farming)status?!Please!check!one.!
!!I!am!a!fullJtime!farmer! ! !!I!am!a!partJtime!farmer!
!!I!am!a!retired!farmer! ! ! !!I!am!a!retired!nonJfarmer!
!!I!am!a!nonJfarmer! ! ! !!Other_______________!
!
28.)Is)your)permanent)home)located)on)your)farmland?)
!!Yes,!my!home!is!located!on!my!land!
!!No,!I!live!within!30!miles!from!my!land!
!!No,!I!live!between!31!and!150!miles!from!my!land!
!!No,!I!live!between!151!and!300!miles!from!my!land!
!!No,!I!live!more!than!300!miles!from!my!land!
!
30.)What)is)highest)level)of)formal)education)you)have)completed?)
!!Some!High!School!or!Less! ! !!Technical/Community!College!Degree!
!!High!School/GED! ! ! !!Bachelor’s!Degree!!
!!Some!College! ! ! ! !!Graduate/Professional!Degree!
! ! !
31.)What)was)your)total)annual)household)income)from)all)sources,)before)taxes,)in)2009?)
!!less!than!$25,000! ! ! !!$75,001J$100,000! !
!!$25,001J$50,000! ! ! !!$100,001J$150,000!
!!$50,001J$75,000! ! ! !!more!than!$150,000!
!
32.)What)was)your)net)cash)farm)income)from)farm)operations)in)2009,)including)rental)income?)
!!Less!than!$0!(Net!Loss)! ! !!$10,001J$25,000! ! !
!!$0J$5,000! ! ! ! !!$25,001J$50,000!
!!$5,001J$10,000! ! ! !!more!than!$50,000!
!
33.)What)was)your)debt)ratio)(total)debts)divided)by)total)assets))in)2009?)
!!!!0J15%! ! !!45J60%!
!!15J30%! ! !!60J80%!
!!30J45%! ! !!80J100%!
)
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)
34.)We)will)be)conducting)inGperson)and)phone)interviews)with)landowners)to)further)understand))
)))))))their)thoughts)about)perennial)energy)crops.)Would)you)be)interested)in)participating?)
!!Yes! ! ! !!No!
!
If!yes,!what!is!your:!
phone!number:_______________________________!
email:______________________________________!
)
Is)there)anything)else)you)would)like)to)share)with)us?)
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>!
Thank!you!for!taking!the!time!to!complete!this!questionnaire!!!
Please!return!this!form!using!the!prepaid,!self?addressed!envelope.!!
If!you!have!any!questions!regarding!the!study,!please!feel!free!to!contact!us.!!
!
Dr.!Dean!Current,!Center!for!Integrated!Natural!Resources!and!Agriculture,!University!of!Minnesota!
1530!Cleveland!Ave.!North,!St.!Paul,!MN!55108J6112!
curre002@umn.edu;!(612)!624J4299
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